Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-037 *24 February 1995*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

ALBANIA

'Scandalous' Weapons Trade With Montenegro Noted *[KOHA JONE 22 Feb]* 1
Paper Protests 'Barbaric' Regime in FYROM *[RILINDJA 22 Feb]* 1

BULGARIA

Pirinski Views Foreign Policy Priorities *[STANDART NEWS 20 Feb]* 3

CZECH REPUBLIC

Zieleniec Interviewed on Return From Canada *[Prague Radio]* 5
Klaus Assesses Poll Results, Coalition Relations *[LIDOVE NOVINY 17 Feb]* 5
Klaus Comments on Economic Growth, Inflation *[Prague TV]* 5
Klaus on Army Transformation, Figures, Funding *[Prague TV]* 6
Holan: Army Credibility Needs Much Improvement *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 17 Feb]* 6

SLOVAKIA

Prime Minister Denies Aiding Chechnya's Dudayev *[Bratislava Radio]* 8
Parliament Speaker Holds Talks With Holbrooke *[Bratislava Radio]* 8
Kovac Views Political Situation, Developments *[SME 10 Feb]* 8
Schenk on EU Membership, Relations With Germany *[Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT 22 Feb]* 12

HUNGARY

Government Says Papers 'Leaking State Secrets' *[Budapest Radio]* 14
Jewish Group Protests About 'Neo-Nazi' Group *[AFP]* 14
Austrian Chancellor on Relations With Hungary *[Budapest Radio]* 14
Scientists Say Slovak Plant Will Increase Safety *[Budapest TV]* 14
Military Leaders Said 'Unable To Change' *[MAGYAR NEMZET 21 Feb]* 15
Draft Hungarian-Slovak Agreement Previewed *[NEPSZABADSAG 21 Feb]* 15

POLAND

Oleksy Names Luczak as Deputy Prime Minister *[Warsaw Radio]* 17
Foreign Ministry Protests DPRK Expulsions *[Warsaw Radio]* 17
Church Withdraws From Constitution Compromise *[Warsaw TV]* 17
Police Protest Spreads, Generates Reaction *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 23 Feb]* 18
Media Reports About 'CIA Agents' Examined *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 24 Feb]* 18
Power of Wachowski in Walesa's Cabinet Grows *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 19 Feb]* 19
Military Relations With Neighbors Outlined *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 Feb]* 20
Weapons Plant Changing to Nonmilitary Production *[GAZETA BANKOWA 22 Jan]* 21
Hall, Bugaj Define Contemporary Left Wing *[POLITYKA 21 Jan]* 22
Country's Vision of Role in EU Discussed *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 16 Jan]* 24

ROMANIA

Iraqi Delegation Gets Support in Bucharest *[Baghdad INA]* 26
Defected Spy Reportedly Back in Bucharest *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 9 Feb]* 26
Former Official Charged With Espionage *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 7 Feb]* 26
Parliament Approves Subsidy for UDMR *[Budapest Radio]* 26

Communist Party Head Outlines Philosophy, Goals *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 21 Feb]* 27
New Taxes on Small Businesses Decried *[ADEVARUL 7-8 Jan]* 27

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Mladic Warns: 'Istria Will Become a War Zone' *[Rome L'INFORMAZIONE 23 Feb]* 29
Serb Patriarch Meets Bosnian Serb, Croat Leaders 30
Calls for Unity, Peace *[SRNA]* 30
Karadzic Praises Meeting *[SRNA]* 30
Martic, Babic on Unity *[SRNA]* 31
Krajisnik on Possible FRY Recognition of B-H *[NASA BORBA 23 Feb]* 31
Bosnian Croats Will Not Give Up Own State *[TANJUG]* 31
Silajdzic Blames Croats for Agreement Failure *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 23 Feb]* 31
Silajdzic, Ministers Meet Local Officials *[Sarajevo Radio]* 32
Banja Luka Delegation Says 240,000 Expelled *[Sarajevo Radio]* 32

CROATIA

Commentator on Potentials of Serb, Croat Navies *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 22 Feb]* 34
Deputy PM Skego Reviews Economic Trends *[VJESNIK 18 Feb]* 34
Serb Party Leader Says Rights of Serbs Violated *[TANJUG]* 35
Martic To Launch 'Surface-to-Zagreb' Missiles *[Sarajevo Radio]* 36
Martic: UN 'Ignoring' Expulsion of Serbs *[TANJUG]* 36

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Albanian Leaders Meet Gligorov, Discuss Arrests *[RILINDJA 23 Feb]* 37
Xhaferri Condemns 'Police State' Actions *[Tirana TV]* 37
Students Protest Against University in Tetovo *[TANJUG]* 38

SLOVENIA

Draft Agreement on NATO Cooperation Presented *[Ljubljana Radio]* 39
Slovene-Croatian Border Commission Meets *[Ljubljana Radio]* 39
FRY Officer Sentenced for Spying for Slovenia *[DELO 21 Jan]* 39

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Envoy to UN Djokic on Talks With Stoltenberg *[TANJUG]* 40
Army Introduces Cost-Cutting Measures *[VOJSKA 16 Feb]* 40
Former President Cosic Supports Bosnian Serbs *[DNEVNIK 28 Jan]* 41

Serbia

Weekly Claims Milosevic Accepts Russian Plan *[TELEGRAF 22 Feb]* 41
Tomic Spurns Opposition Call for Special Session *[TANJUG]* 43

Kosovo

Serb 'Plunder' of Albanian Businesses Protested *[RILINDJA 22 Feb]* 43

'Scandalous' Weapons Trade With Montenegro Noted

AU2302173595 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 22 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by Jetmir Shpuza: "Montenegrin Police Detain 20 Traffickers Who Brought Weapons Into Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our sources across the border report a wave of arrests by the Montenegrin police in the last few days. They say the number arrested has exceeded 20, and the operation is still continuing. The crossborder trade in weapons between Montenegro and Albania is one of the most scandalous incidents since the alarm over pollution in Lake Shkoder. Montenegrin radio even carried an official report about it. A large number of Montenegrin citizens, mostly of Albanian origin, are involved in this arms trade in automatic rifles, pistols, and grenades. Official Montenegrin police sources state that the weapons are taken from the battlefields of Bosnia-Herzegovina and sold in Albania at reasonable prices. Of course, Albanian citizens are also implicated in this business; they receive large quantities of these weapons and subsequently sell them throughout the north and beyond. This is despite the fact that everybody knows there are serious penalties for the unlawful possession of firearms in the Republic of Albania. These weapons are thought to enter Albania by crossing Lake Shkoder and via the Malesia e Madhe district. About five months ago, some newspapers, including KOHA JONE, deplored this illegal arms trade in the border areas. However, the Public Order Ministry, instead of concentrating its resources on preventing such widespread crime, launched an attack on the journalists who had uncovered the facts, warning them of prosecution via television news bulletins. By implying that the arms trade did not exist but was a sensational slander by journalists, the police discounted the warnings of the press, and thus encourages this kind of smuggling.

Reports of weapons smuggling were substantiated by the fact that a number of Yugoslav-made Zastava automatic rifles and pistols, in addition to grenades, were seized in Malesia e Madhe—as well as by two other highly obvious facts: the many murders, and gunshots at weddings in Malesia e Madhe and Shkoder. These were all signs of the widespread use of weapons. Nevertheless, the Public Order Ministry denied the existence of an illegal arms trade, calling it slander. Shkoder policeman Marjan Prendi drew public attention to this trade in a television program on blood feuds. Asked by journalist Arjana Qatipi about the presence of weapons, he gave a courageous reply contradicting the ministry's previous statement. Arms come and go across the border, Mr. Prendi said. The recent discoveries by the Montenegrin police merely further substantiate this evidence. It is a fact that even clothing looted from the battlefields of the former Yugoslavia is sold in Shkoder and Malesia e Madho. This leads to the conclusion that we are dealing with increasing contraband of this kind, in which weapons take priority. The large-scale operations of the Montenegrin police are the best confirmation of this.

Paper Protests 'Barbaric' Regime in FYROM

AU2302125795 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 22 Feb 95 p 2

[Commentary by Sylejman Aliu: "Wretched Anti-Albanianism in the Blood"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As elsewhere, the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] too are raising their demands, whether important or not, sometimes at the proper time and sometimes not, sometimes concertedly and sometimes limply, but always on a painful path that has included sacrifices and casualties. These demands have always been trampled underfoot, perhaps because they have been uncertainly presented and have left gaps for doubts and wavering convictions. Like the Serbian regime in occupied Kosova, the Macedonian regime has not treated these demands with proper seriousness and weight but has hurriedly resorted to trickery, dividing the Albanians and exploiting these divisions in order to minimize or eliminate entirely the Albanians' vital national demands. If the Macedonian regime fails to meet with success and is unable to recruit the odd hired hand from among the ranks of the Albanians, it will be stripped of all its arguments apart from state violence and terror. There are various aspects to this terror and violence, but the most important are, first, that the Macedonian regime thereby gives firm proof of its anti-Albanianism to Athens and Belgrade (because this trio should have reached an understanding); and second, that this behavior by a barbaric and medieval regime informs everyone both at home and abroad that all the various international missions committed to "solving the problems in Macedonia" are quite impotent when faced with a regime like this Macedonian one, which is not only powerful but is following a strategy of fundamentalist Orthodox conquest. Another dimension that is important here is that, by behaving this way, the Macedonian regime and President Gligorov wish to cock a snook at the international community, which is never weary of helping them on "the path of democratizing Macedonia."

If this latter statement does not hold water, and the Macedonian regime does not intend to make a mockery of the international community and the United States with such barbaric terrorist operations, then another question arises: How can the international community and the United States tolerate the spectacle of the Albanian people, who have finally succeeded in uniting their voices in order to demand a university, being murdered and terrorized before their eyes? If the international community cannot protect a people seeking to be educated within its own state—as Albanian Shkup [Skopje] and Tetova demand—from another provocative people, always infected with a desire for war, which is seeking to infect the entire Balkans and has become a

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warmongering link between Belgrade and Athens, then the authority of the international community and the commitment of the United States in this area will appear differently to Albanian eyes and minds.

The Macedonian regime is murdering the Albanian people because the latter are asking for their own schools and universities. It is killing them in front of the eyesofthe world, which has arrived in Macedonia in order to "help democratization," whose only ingredients are murder, violence, and terror. Nevertheless, this wretched anti-Albanianism in the blood of the Macedonians will not succeed in blunting the will of the Albanian people for their own university, even if all Macedonia is turned upside down.

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Pirinski Views Foreign Policy Priorities

AU2302195395 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 20 Feb 95 p 18

[Interview with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski by Tatyana Vasileva; place and date not given: "I Do Not View Foreign Policy as a Series of Curtsies: Once to the East and Once to the West"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vasileva] Mr. Minister, what did you discuss with UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali?

[Pirinski] Mr. Butrus-Ghali wanted to know whether Bulgaria, through its contacts and initiatives, could play a more active role in finding other acceptable solutions to the hot issues not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] relations with its neighbors. According to him, Bulgaria must pose most actively the compensations issue at the United Nations and in the Security Council, while stressing what it is doing to observe the sanctions and describing the scope of its losses. Despite the fact that the compensations issue should be resolved by the international financial institutions rather than by the United Nations, I was encouraged by the fact that Mr. Butrus-Ghali said that he would cooperate in reviewing the losses we are suffering as a result of the embargo.

[Vasileva] How would you assess the Bulgarian visit to the United States?

[Pirinski] The most useful factor was that we succeeded in presenting Bulgaria's position to the most responsible representatives of the U.S. Administration and the U.S. Congress. I think that our arguments were met with understanding and a benevolent attitude. Now it is up to us to prove that we have mobilized all our domestic resources as a state and that we are sincere in our willingness to be a stable partner.

[Vasileva] What is the value of the joint Bulgarian-U.S. declaration?

[Pirinski] Its value is very high. The signatures of Presidents Clinton and Zhelev are a fact of first-rate importance. It signifies a new level of relations with the United States and allows the possibility of reviewing every future issue within the context of the document that has been signed. I think that the U.S. Administration's commitment to eliminate the "Jackson-Venick" trade amendment is very important.

[Vasileva] Are you concerned about the contradiction between President Zhelev's wishes and the policy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] government in anything related to the integration into NATO and the EU?

[Pirinski] There is only one direction for the government—integration into and coming together with European structures. As far as the integration into European structures is concerned, you know that it involves active cooperation with the West European Union [WEU] in the sphere of defense policy. The WEU is not an isolated organization. It is a component of the Euro-Atlantic defense system. Thus, when we talk about integration into the European structures, we must remember that the issue also has an Atlantic dimension. On the other hand, our relations with NATO are developing along the Partnership for Peace program. The government confirmed its commitment related to Bulgaria's full-fledged participation in the initiative. NATO is presently in the midst of self-analysis and is reassessing its development. In this context, I would also cite President Clinton's message to President Zhelev on the eve of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] Budapest meeting in December 1994, which pointed out that NATO's process of expansion must be evolutionary and open, that it must develop in a manner that would not create a new division of Europe, and that it must depend on the contribution each prospective member could make to NATO's defensive mission. Thus, the issue is not that much in the wish to become a member, but in the possibilities that exist and the commitments we could assume.

[Vasileva] Was the Bulgarian delegation in the United States a uniform unit?

[Pirinski] This was a delegation that presented a single position.

[Vasileva] How did the U.S. Administration react to the Bulgarian Government's intentions?

[Pirinski] It reacted in a benevolent manner. The U.S. side accepted the intention we declared and demonstrated that it is prepared to cooperate with us in implementing the governmental program.

[Vasileva] Did you sense any reservations regarding the fact that the Socialists have returned to power?

[Pirinski] Yes, such reservations emerged during the talks with the representatives of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. They were interested in the development of relations between the president and the parliamentary majority, as well as in the policy of the government formed by this majority. I have the feeling that the senators and congressmen did not have any direct impressions of Bulgaria and the policy of its government, and therefore posed questions from the position of obsolete stereotypes and impressions formed in advance.

I do not think they were objective. The talks helped us disperse their suspicions, not because of what they heard from us but because of what President Zhelev said—namely, that the Bulgarian voters voted for the BSP not because of its past but because of their expectations related to the BSP's future, which will differ from the party's past. This has been accepted as a sufficient assurance that counterbalanced the fear concerning a restoration or a return to the past.

[Vasileva] Do you think that foreign policy should be formed by the government or by parliament?

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[Pirinski] This must be a joint effort and common process. You know that the Council of Ministers has been charged with conducting domestic and foreign policy. This includes the working out of political positions and doctrines. Naturally, those decisions of the Council of Ministers must be discussed by parliament and its specialized commissions on foreign policy and on national security. I think that the economic commission also must be an important participant in working out foreign policy priorities.

[Vasileva] You promised cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Assembly Foreign Policy Commission. How would this cooperation come about?

[Pirinski] I have already talked to Nikolay Kamov and Atanas Paparizov, with whom we tried to specify the basic forms through which we will maintain constant rather than sporadic contact. The commission will also be involved in conducting foreign policy. As you know, a joint group with parliamentarians from the EU and deputies that have participated in the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe will be created. I think that the Foreign Ministry could help the parliament with its contacts at the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe or in working out positions.

[Vasileva] How would your joint work be affected by the fact that the chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission and the leader of the delegation to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe are members of two different currents within the BSP?

[Pirinski] It is a bit schematic to expect this fact to reflect in every position of current BSP policy. The gentlemen you mentioned are categorical in their intention to conduct a foreign policy that is beneficial to our country. This means a commitment to implement the BSP election platform and the government's program declaration. I know there have been many attempts to create a contradiction between the BSP's preelection intentions and the cabinet program, but this is an unfounded venture of propaganda character.

[Vasileva] Is viewing the European integration a priority and not a special curtsy toward Russia and its reservations vis-a-vis NATO?

[Pirinski] I do not view foreign policy as a series of curtsies, once to the East and once to the West—or an attempt to favor one side and then the other. I would like our foreign policy to be a series of actions that stabilize, step by step, our national security and create the possibility of effecting closer economic cooperation. Bulgaria is an associated member of the EU and we must understand that if we implement our commitments correctly we will gain a serious advantage. Simultaneously, we are actively engaged in the Partnership for Peace, which at present is a form of Atlantic cooperation. Therefore, we will study everything that has been offered by the Euro-Atlantic factor and will try to analyze it from a point of view of Bulgarian interests.

[Vasileva] Do you agree with the president's argument that the Bulgaria-Greece-Turkey triangle as NATO members is a prerequisite of stability in the Balkans?

[Pirinski] I am not sure that stability could be presented in such a simplified manner. The talks at the Pentagon and with Secretary of Defense William Perry were indicative in this respect. At those talks, a participant on the U.S. side said that last year's Breeze-94 Black Sea maneuvers were an example of cooperation. He said that it is impossible to organize such maneuvers with the participation of Turkey, Greece, Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and Bulgaria in any other place. Such a role on the part of our state could strengthen our national security. It must not be based on certain curtsies or preferences but on a balance of interests that must be sufficiently clear and acceptable to our basic partners.

[Vasileva] Until now, the Bulgarian governments have been criticized for not thinking about future relations with Serbia because of the embargo. Do you intend to activate contacts with Belgrade against the background of the general desire to peacefully resolve the conflict?

[Pirinski] There are two aspects to this issue. Until now the policy of the Bulgarian governments has been generally recognized as balanced and stable. However, your question is justified because many countries think that our policy is a bit passive and that it rather is a policy of noncommitment. The assessment whether a more complex policy toward Belgrade is possible is a rather complicated matter. However, I would not reduce our Balkan policy to relations with a single neighbor country, because problems in our region are mutually related and if you want to activate relations, you must do this in several directions. One must not lose this valuable factor of balancing different lines of neighborly relations.

[Vasileva] Turkey is concerned with BSP's good relations with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] and thinks that this could cause an intensification in Bulgarian-Greek relations at the expense of Bulgarian-Turkish relations.

[Pirinski] This is one of the Balkan policy's problems. Every closer contact or improved relations with one partner immediately evoke suspicions and expectation of something negative in other partners. The last Bulgarian governments and our government do not view relations as opposing one partner to another, but as readiness to build up confidence. Each of our neighbors has enough problems and each views relations with Bulgaria through the prism of its own conflicts and confrontations. I think until now Bulgaria has not tried and will not try in the future to gain any dividends from the confrontation in the Balkans.

[Vasileva] Is the Balkan meeting proposed by Dr. Zhelev possible, and is the Bulgarian Government prepared to help implement this idea?

[Pirinski] In principle, the idea is interesting and it must always be kept in mind not only by the Bulgarian leadership but also by all Balkan states. I think that, for the time being, no conditions of organizing such a meeting exist. A specific evolution in the general situation in the Balkans and bilateral contacts could lead to organizing such a meeting.

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Zieleniec Interviewed on Return From Canada

LD2302201695 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec today returned from an official four-day visit to Canada. Klara Stejskalova interviewed him.

[Begin recording] [Stejskalova] Minister, can you tell us about your meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien?

[Zieleniec] We talked about international issues related to NATO expansion. Prime Minister Chretien said unambiguously that Canada is very much in favor of NATO expansion.

We also discussed the situation in Croatia, where our troops are next to each another. We are now facing their withdrawal in a rather complicated situation, when Croatia wants all of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] troops to leave. We particularly talked about NATO participation during the preparation for the withdrawal. [passage omitted]

Klaus Assesses Poll Results, Coalition Relations

AU2302210195 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 17 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova; place and date not given: "I Like the President's Speech"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Martinkova] According to the most recent opinion poll, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] has improved to 30 percent, but the coalition as a whole, compared with January, has declined in popularity. The position of the social democrats has much improved. Does this not bother you?

[Klaus] I would assess the STEM [Center for Empirical Research] results a little more soberly. We all know that far-reaching conclusions should not be reached from short-term swings. I am not sure if the coalition has declined in popularity. According to my perfunctory analysis of the opinion poll results, the social democrats and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia together have roughly as much as the ODS. If we add the support for the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, then the coalition has a clear majority. I do not see this as a decline. On the contrary, the fact that only five political parties have a chance of getting into parliament is a huge step forward. This is what this country needs. We must not be a small country with dozens of political parties, with a fragmented political spectrum. This would be a political spectrum of five ideologically clearly defined parties; this is also necessary.

[Martinkova] The events surrounding the BIS [Security and Information Service], however, have certainly affected the public's confidence in the coalition...

[Klaus] The results of the public opinion poll do not confirm this; at least, I do not see this in them. However, there is no doubt that the unleashing of the affair surrounding the BIS could shake the public's confidence in some of this country's institutions and, rightly or wrongly, they are associated with the coalition. This annoys me a lot and I cannot easily condone those responsible for it.

[Martinkova] You do not, then, acknowledge the argument that, if the ODS' style of work within the coalition were different, such affairs would not occur?

[Klaus] I disagree fundamentally with the idea that the ODS' style of work within the coalition would be bad. I cannot help it, but, although we are talking about a coalition, it is necessary to respect the existing deployment of forces. I insist that the ODS is not abusing this. I fight tooth and nail to make sure that voting in the government does not end up 10:9. If it should come to this, I withdraw the item from the agenda and look for a different solution. Criticism of the ODS' style of work within the coalition is an insidious attack on the part of Messrs. Masek, Kuzilek, and others.

[Martinkova] President Havel is to deliver a major speech on Czech-German issues on Friday [17 February]; you are preparing to make a speech on the same topic in Hamburg shortly afterwards. Is this a new era in Czech-German relations?

[Klaus] I would not like to compare the importance of these two speeches. The president's speech is indeed a major one; the speech I am to deliver in Hamburg is just a partial one. It covers topics such as the Czech Republic in general, the Czech Republic and Germany, and the Czech Republic and Europe. In this sense, these speeches are not even competing with each other; they are not even in the same league. The great affinity and similarity in stances on the Czech-German issue is something else. I have to admit that I have read the president's speech and that I really like its basic concept, which is identical with mine.

Klaus Comments on Economic Growth, Inflation

LD2302214995 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting with the representatives of Czech companies and banks today, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus criticized the banks' high interest rates and their procedures for providing loans. This year, according to Klaus, the Czech economy should enjoy 1-percent or even 2-percent growth.

[Begin Klaus recording] Regarding the aggregate demand, the government will not directly look after the speed of the economic growth, or shall I say, it will not take care of it by means of its macroeconomic measures.

We will be completing privatization, we will tune up system changes, we will improve legislation, but in all

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other aspects the state and its institutions will be diminishing their roles more and more. [end recording]

According to the prime minister, the government is concentrating on lowering inflation by some 1 or 2 percent a year. The taxes should also be lower. Vaclav Klaus does not expect the rise of unemployment subsequent to economic growth.

The prime minister also spoke in favor in preserving fixed exchange rates. According to Vaclav Klaus, the influx of foreign capital will continue.

Klaus on Army Transformation, Figures, Funding

LD2302225695 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] During his visit to the Czech Army air base in Namest nad Oslavou [south Moravia], Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus rejected the views suggesting that the transformation of the Army was slower than in any other area. According to the prime minister, the Czech Army has gone through one round of slimming and there is no need to continue this process at this time.

[Unidentified correspondent] Out of 15 military air bases of the former Federal Army only five remain at present. One of the most important is situated here, at Namest nad Oslavou. Last April a model modern military air base was created here.

From 1990, 60 units of strategic air force were either closed down or changed their character. There are 8,500 more personnel, but 390 pilots less at the military air bases than five years ago. The number of fighter planes was reduced from 170 to 60. There are, however, some problems with technology that is, by and large, still Russian. [passage omitted]

Therefore, The soldiers will welcome the offer that the U.S. Army made this week regarding the sale of the state-of-the-art army technology.

[Begin Klaus recording] It is a major problem for our army to decide on the priorities at the moment, whether to buy the state-of-the-art technology, maintain the existing technology, or build premises for soldiers that are much needed. Generally speaking, I welcome that the United States decided to offer the latest technology, but how much and when we buy is a different matter. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Begin Klaus recording] Any issue regarding compensation or costs of these matters is, in my view, a part of the Army budget. It is not possible to fund this from any other part of the budget, it makes no sense. [end recording]

[Announcer] The confidence in the army is decreasing. According to a survey carried out by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in February, only 36 percent of citizens have confidence in the army, while 50 percent have no confidence.

In comparison with the same period last year, these figures represent a 21 percent decrease. Workers with their 41 percent and the Civic Democratic Party followers with 46 percent have more confidence. The army is least trusted by the university graduates—56 percent; the followers of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Left Bloc, and the Party of Democratic Left—58 percent; and Civic Democratic Alliance—56 percent.

Holan: Army Credibility Needs Much Improvement

AU2402090795 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Feb 95 p 13

[Article by Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan: "Integrating Into NATO and Defending Sovereignty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the military point of view, it is possible to talk about two sets of conditions that the army and society have to fulfill if they want to aspire to admission into the North Atlantic Alliance.

The first set of conditions concerns the army directly. It does not mean the necessity of immediate mass rearmament. Even the NATO states have different weapons systems at their disposal, except the communications and command systems. Therefore, these systems are being spoken of as the main priority in modernizing our army. No less important is changing the way of thinking in the army, especially among the commanders. This requires not only time, but also investment in education. Today, there are already hundreds of officers in the army who have gone through special courses in the NATO states' military academies. These people are gradually changing the army's spirit and even the greatest skeptic has to acknowledge that they are succeeding in this.

The second set of conditions only partly concerns the army, but is fundamental for our admission into NATO. This is the willingness and readiness of citizens, first, to defend our state with our own forces and, then, the willingness and readiness to contribute commensurately to defending European (or global) security. Only then will we have a right to alliance-based security guarantees.

This certainly raises the question of to what extent our whole society is prepared—not only materially, but also spiritually—to defend itself. And also, how prepared we are to take part, if need be, in defending the sovereignty of another state.

If we look back into the past, apart from the short period of the First Republic, we have never actually had real state sovereignty. After 1948, it was sovereignty and it was not. Certainly, we were not convinced of the need (apart from in 1968) to defend it. Now, we are citizens of a sovereign state. We are slowly getting used to this

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feeling and we are discovering something that we could define as a feeling of national pride. It is, therefore, quite natural that almost 80 percent of the population acknowledges the need for defense. What, however, is unnatural is that recently only 27 percent of citizens wanted to become personally involved in defending this state. It is as if the unfortunate heritage of our past had manifested itself here, a heritage that we should overcome as quickly as possible.

It is very difficult to talk about the need to prepare ourselves for defense in a situation in which the danger of a military threat to our country in the near future is minimal. On the other hand, however, it is necessary to concede that a state must prepare for its defense over a longer period. Mere resolve at a moment of threat is not enough. That could be too late. Therefore, it is still not possible to abolish general conscription and basic military service; therefore, it is necessary to continue to prepare citizens for defense.

What, then, is possible?

Within the army, it is possible to do everything to make sure that young men do not have the feeling that basic military service is a waste of time, but that it can give them something. Getting through it should not be just a natural duty, but should also be a specific advantage for civilian life. In some countries (in France, for example), it is impossible to work in state services if you have not gone through military service. This is one of the options. At the same time, improving discipline with the recognition that this is not at variance with democracy must go along with this.

A great deal has to be done to improve our army's credibility and self-confidence. I am convinced, however, that the solution to these two problems also lies partly outside the army. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognize that the army itself still has to improve in many things. On the other, however, I think that even if the best officers from the best army in the world were to change into our soldiers' uniforms, this would not be manifested in an improvement in the army's prestige. Criticizing the army has been a national sport in our country for too long.

Relations between the army and the public in the regions are now improving. Political representatives are also realizing that one of the symbols of sovereignty is a self-confident high-quality army and that they can give it a major part of this self-confidence.

So, I am convinced that the army and the public have already passed the critical peak in their relationship and that the process of resuming and improving mutual trust is beginning. This is terribly important not only for the army itself, but also for our state's credibility during its integration into the North Atlantic Alliance.

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Prime Minister Denies Aiding Chechnya's Dudayev

LD2402133095 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, is in Budapest at this time. Michal Tvarozek interviews Vladimir Meciar on his meeting yesterday with Holbrooke:

[Begin recording] [Passage omitted] [Tvarozek] Two weeks ago the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA daily published a recording of a telephone conversation between Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev and Iskender Gamidov, former minister of the interior of Azerbaijan and head of a nationalist organization. The daily publishes another part of their telephone conversation today. I will quote a part. Iskender says, as I understand it, that they assigned $500 million to the lawful government of Chechnya—correction: not $500 million but $500,000. Dudayev asks who assigned the money. Iskender replies: Slovakia assigned $250,000 for Dudayev.

[Meciar] First, the Slovak Republic, its government, and I personally declared that the situation in Chechnya is an internal affair of Russia. The beyond-the-scene maneuvers that led to Russia's having to use force to solve the Chechen crisis—and the reasons are quite serious—have not been fully revealed. The Slovak Republic did not interfere in this process in any way. It does not at all intend to support Dudayev against the legitimate government of the Russian Federation. On the contrary, I am acquainted with the fact that our ambassador offered help in Moscow for the reconstruction of Grozny or for investments in Chechnya, such that Slovak state firms could help with material deliveries, whether construction materials or labor, for reconstruction. But the Slovak Republic will on no account support any organized groups that oppose the legitimate government. Somebody is trying to muzzle us again. And that is not good. We resolutely distance ourselves from it. [end recording]

Parliament Speaker Holds Talks With Holbrooke

LD2402143695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak National Council Chairman Ivan Gasparovic received in Bratislava today Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. assistant secretary of state.

One of the main topics of their conversation was the question of security in the Central European region and Slovakia's membership in NATO. The National Council chairman also talked with Richard Holbrooke about the current internal political situation, relations between Slovakia and Hungary, and freedom of the press and their influence on internal political events.

During a brief news conference, Richard Holbrooke stressed that the United States is closely following events in our country and is interested in Slovakia's becoming a NATO member. According to him, military compatibility and political stability in the country are significant.

Kovac Views Political Situation, Developments

AU2402110995 Bratislava SME in Slovak 10 Feb 95 p 5

[Interview with President Michal Kovac by Jana Pankovcinova and Robert Kotian; place and date not given: "No Office Is Worth Betraying One's Own Ideals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two years ago, on 15 February 1993, the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] elected Michal Kovac, candidate of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], president of the Slovak Republic. Of the 148 deputies present, 106 cast their votes for him. Before the vote, still as candidate, he said, among other things: "I want to be the president of all our fellow citizens, an independent and nonpartisan president, which arises from the nature of presidency itself." The following interview with Michal Kovac is also about which of his resolutions as president of the Slovak Republic he has managed to fulfill.

[SME] The Slovak Constitution defines your powers rather precisely. Nonetheless, there have been several situations recently when it was not quite clear what were your rights and where you exceeded them. Do you believe that it is sufficient to comply with the rulings of the Constitutional Court, as is the case in the United States, for instance, where the articles of the Constitution are interpreted by the Supreme Court, or do you think that it would be more appropriate to amend the Constitution? If you do, how do you think should it be amended?

[Kovac] I consider the present powers of the president of the Slovak Republic sufficient, also because we had quite consciously opted for a parliamentary, and not a presidential, system of power and any grievous interventions in the Constitution could, in my opinion, destabilize our situation. They would not strengthen the awareness that the Constitution is the supreme law that cannot be changed according to one's whims and fancies. I believe that, for the time being, verdicts of the Constitutional Court on contentious issues are sufficient for the Constitution to receive its final shape. We should wait at least four or five years before intervening in the Constitution. This will be the time to analyze it, also with regard to the approaching date of the Slovak Republic's admission into the EU and cooperation within the framework of European structures. The question of dissolution of parliament in the event of a parliamentary crisis appears to me to be the most problematic issue. But even during parliament's preceding term no one trusted that parliament would be able to tackle itself the critical situation the way it did—that is, by calling early elections. This example shows that, even though our

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Constitution, in contrast to other constitutions, does not establish any clear mechanism for dealing with such situations, the NRSR ultimately found a solution and adopted this solution in a constitutional way.

[SME] You consider the parliamentary system to be optimal for our country. In spite of this, opinions exist to the effect that this system needs to be changed, doubts are being cast on the Constitutional Court, and its rulings are not being observed.... How do you view those facts in connection with attacks on your person and the possible shortening of your term of office?

[Kovac] The government's policy statement does not contain any provisions on changing the constitutional system. Apparently, the only thing that exists are reflections of individuals. I believe that there exists only one possibility of shortening the president's term of office—if the president is not fit for work for more than one year and cannot perform his duties. Our Constitution knows no other way of shortening the president's term of office. This would be something absolutely unusual and would call into question constitutional officials' respect for the Constitution's stability. In my opinion, it is not possible to conceive of any other methods of shortening the president's term of office if the Constitution expressly states under which conditions this is possible.

[SME] While on the subject of the Constitution being called into question: Recently we witnessed how a civil servant cast doubt on a ruling issued by the Constitutional Court, which has been qualified by some as a "sick element on the scene" [allusion to a statement by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar]. As the head of state, you guarantee the constitutional development of this society and are probably aware of reactions to, and possible consequences of, the permanent calling into question of the constitutional pillars of the state....

[Kovac] First of all, I have to note that the president is not the safeguard or guarantor of constitutional development. Rather, it is the task of the Constitutional Court and other independent bodies of the democratic state to protect compliance with laws and the Constitution. The president can, from the position of his office, point to situations that might jeopardize compliance with the constitution and the democratic system, but he does not have the powers to be able to guarantee this. Calling into question the rulings, or verdicts, of the Constitutional Court is dangerous and therefore irresponsible, especially if this is done by public and constitutional officials. We all realize that stability of our constitutional system and legal order is an important element of domestic political stability. The permanent questioning of the decisions of the Constitutional Court or other bodies, or the willful interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution or individual laws, really is harmful. It would be necessary for all constitutional officials, including political representatives, to realize their responsibility and to refrain from such statements inasmuch as possible. We have established mechanisms and platforms for dealing with those issues. It is up to them to find the right time and methods of setting right possible imperfections.

[SME] Connected with the questioning of the Constitution and the president is the establishment of a parliamentary commission of inquiry to investigate the causes of the constitutional crisis of 1994. This commission was set up by the government coalition in November 1994. What is your assessment of the establishment of this commission and of the fact that only deputies for the HZDS and the Slovak National Party [SNS] are represented in it, and no deputies for the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], let alone opposition deputies?

[Kovac] It is parliament's right, in accordance with the NRSR's powers and the NRSR rules of procedure, to establish such a commission of inquiry. Another question is whether the causes of what is called last year's crisis ought to be analyzed by a commission of inquiry, or elsewhere. Personally, I am convinced that it would be more appropriate to deal with this issue within a different institution, some scientific research establishment that could deal with this problem in relation to the constitutional system and the legal order in general. Such an analysis would not have to arouse anyone's political concern, no one would expect from it any immediate political decisions, but it could be perceived as a quite legitimate approach to examining the causes of something that might be considered undesirable, or only exceptional, and the recurrence of which ought to be prevented in the future, if domestic political stability is to be secured.

[SME] It is a public secret that you, too, as president of the Slovak Republic, should become subject of this commission's investigations. Many HZDS deputies hold it against you that, in your New Year's address on 1 January 1994, you advocated the formation of a broader coalition. They claim that, by this address, you contributed to society's destabilization and to the situation that led to the dismissal in March 1994 of Vladimir Meciar's then government. How do you view the events from the beginning of 1994 to March 1994 after the passage of one year? Do you agree with the claim of the commission's chairman, Dusan Macuska, made repeatedly in the media, that something was going on behind the scenes at that time?

[Kovac] The president of the republic has access to information that the appropriate bodies and institutions are obliged to supply to him. There exists no legitimate [legitimni] information suggesting that something unlawful, something that ought to be the subject of investigations, happened in connection with the events of March 1994. I do not know what other legitimate information about the aforementioned events exists. I am myself anxious to find out about it and believe that, if we learn this information, we all will be able to assess whether it corresponds with the processes of those days or whether it is only a subjective interpretation of certain

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events, processes, and so forth. I still perceive the events of one year ago as conducive to the stabilization of our domestic political situation. The debate about new elections started as early as the second half of 1993. The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], in particular, saw new elections as a way out of possible crises, pointing out that a new state had come into being and that the new state's bodies ought to be constituted on the basis of new elections. It is also known that it was only with great difficulty that the government secured for itself a parliamentary majority. It was thus necessary to seek some positive solutions that would stabilize the situation. Under conditions of a constant fear about whether this or that law will pass, it is difficult to achieve conditions for the government's conceptual and purposeful work. A certain pressure thus came into being for the formation of a broader coalition government and that was the demand that I put forward in my New Year's address and in my speech [in parliament] in March. Even with the passing of time I have no reason to change anything about my words. Both the post-March and postelection developments have shown that it is necessary to reckon with coalition governments, possibly for quite a long time to come. The situation after the elections confirmed that my call for the formation of a broader coalition government was warranted. Had the appropriate agreements been concluded, it would not even have been necessary to hold new elections and it would have been possible for a coalition government to work peacefully to this day. Nothing, except the inability of political representatives to find consensus, stood in the way of the realization of this idea already last year. It is necessary to recall that, even after the passage of the vote of no-confidence in the prime minister and the government's resignation, the president of the republic once again turned to the HZDS and asked it to form a coalition government. As you know, my offer was not accepted.

[SME] Mr. Macuska did not rule out that they would invite you to explain your stands of last year. Would you accept such an invitation from the commission of inquiry?

[Kovac] I am under no obligation to appear before the commission of inquiry. It would depend on what they would want to ask me. If they wanted to, they could submit to me their questions in writing or they could come to me and I would hear them out. Only then would I decide whether to react to the submitted questions in the first place.

[SME] Following your last year's New Year's address, two different broad coalition governments were formed in Slovakia in the course of 1994. You had called for such a government, speaking about the need to bring together competent experts from all political camps and experts without party affiliation. We have now had experience of two broad coalitions. Could you compare them in retrospect and characterize what your idea of a broad coalition has brought Slovakia?

[Kovac] I do not think that the appropriate time has come yet for such a comparison because the new government has not been in office for even 100 days. It really is necessary to wait before such a comparison can be made. While I am an advocate of the idea that the methods applied in political life are important, the results are equally important. I would prefer to assess activity on the basis of attained results. Only one thing has been confirmed so far—that the fragmentation of the political spectrum of our society is such that respect for the interests of the majority of citizens requires cooperation of a number of political entities. Unfortunately, the notion has gained ground that there must be irreconcilable struggle between the coalition and the opposition. I believe that a certain struggle is waged during the election campaign, when political entities vie for voters' confidence, but that when the election results are known, a government is formed, and it becomes clear who makes up the government and who is in opposition, a phase of certain cooperation should set in. This cooperation should not be confined to the coalition partners but cooperation is possible, and essential, also between the opposition and the government coalition. The opposition plays a very important role in that it controls the government's activity. I can imagine that, if it did not function as the government's opponent, it is quite possible that the government would commit a number of mistakes and errors. On the other hand, the coalition should show respect for various proposals and ideas put forward by the opposition and should see to it that those of them that are in harmony with general interests, and do not conflict with its concept and policy statement, find their way into the relevant laws and decisions. It would be necessary to arrive at such a situation in our society as soon as possible. Perhaps, we would not be speaking about political enmity then but, rather, about fair competition, constructive criticism and opposition, and the like.

[SME] In March 1994 you delivered in the NRSR your first report on the state of Slovak society. The Constitution gives you this right and you intend to make use of it also this year. Would you change anything about your last year's report? How different will be the report you are preparing now, and on what will you center in it?

[Kovac] As for the text of my last year's report, I do not know what should be changed. It reflected my view of the situation of society from various angles—political, economic, social, and others. I would not want situations to arise that would require supplements such as the one I added to my last year's report on the state of society. Now I want to deliver another report on the state of society. We are looking for a different concept of the report, one that would correspond more to my idea of the president's nonpartisan and universal view of the state and evolution of our society. We believe that it is necessary to try to formulate certain values that could be the common denominator for various social forces, political and nonpolitical, and a criterion reflecting a certain state in individual spheres of our society. The

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analysis of the state of our society could lead to the formulation of the most important national and state interests of the Slovak Republic and to an attempt to create the vision of what kind of a Slovak society we want to have, for instance, at the turn of the millennium or in the first decade of the next millennium. The report could also serve as a good impetus for the work of various scientific and technical institutions on a modernization program for Slovak society. This program should then become a certain point of departure, from which political parties and governments could draw new inspiration for their own programs. One of the sources of Japanese successes is that they created a completely clear vision of their future development, which they drafted with precision and the proper headway. Governments would then be able to proceed from this vision and would only have to specify individual steps in their programs. We want to involve our most distinguished scientists and researchers in the drafting of this report. Time will show how successful we will be.

[SME] You intend to come up with a positive vision of Slovakia's development. When we remember that some of your previous positive steps did not meet with too great an understanding in a part of our society, are you not afraid that the effect could be similar to that produced by your gesture of reconciliation?

[Kovac] Each positive act of every individual, institution, and politician, regardless of criticism leveled against it, makes a positive impact on society's awareness. I do not expect only positive reactions but I believe that one should not abandon positive efforts because they meet with rejection of one kind or another. In other words, I do not believe that my political gesture of reconciliation, for example, was a superfluous step because the response to it was different. It was not superfluous. It found its way into society's awareness, it is alive. A different question is that it could have made a bigger impact if unnecessary obstacles had not been placed in its way and if it were followed by similar accommodating steps. But even if they are not followed by such steps, I am convinced of the need to continue those efforts. This does not mean that one should retreat before something that we do not consider good and beneficial. Not at all. However, it is necessary to realize that everything that is to manifest itself positively in the development of society requires much energy, patience, and effort and that it does not come into being simply and automatically.

[SME] Slovakia is divided today politically, along church lines, even the Greens and the Social Democrats are divided. Communication between the two parts of our divided society is dying out. This can be seen in parliament. If any communication is left is at all, it is becoming increasingly radical and negativistic—let us just recall the latest statements of SNS representatives. What can you do against this division as president?

[Kovac] I can reply to steps that attempt to renew confrontation, sow instability, grudges, and hatred, and that drive a wedge between people by positive deeds, by rejecting such steps, and by stretching out my hand and offering cooperation. I see no other way but being accommodating and permanently present positive programs and deeds. Otherwise there would be an endless war and, in retrospect, we would note with anguish that it served no purpose whatsoever.

[SME] You speak about an endless war. Some kind of an endless war arose also around your letter to Mr. Orme. Is it at all possible to wind up this affair after the NRSR chairman did not accept your explanatory letter and did not rule out the possibility of parliament taking up this issue again?

[Kovac] I believe that it is possible. Unless something serious and important happens, I simply will not react to it. I insist on my reply and, in this case, have no desire to be the one to draw a line under everything. If parliament or the NRSR chairman wish to do so, I will gladly leave it to them. Of course, if matters grew into certain undesirable proportions and I had the feeling that a considerable part of society demands that the president react to the situation, I would probably have to react. It seems to me, however, that I should wait a month or two. I am firmly convinced that a growing number of deputies, but also representatives of political parties, realize that our society is facing very serious problems and that parliament has other important matters to discuss. Citizens must be convinced that preference is being given to the tasks arising from the policy statements and not to some affairs that someone, for one reason or another, needs to elevate to the status of the main, or almost crucial, issue of our political life.

[SME] Do you not perceive those affairs—the Panic letter, or your letter to Mr. Orme—as being intended to divert the public's attention from problems that are of genuine importance to it, be it crime, unemployment, the subsistence minimum, apartments, medication, or the halted coupon privatization?

[Kovac] I have not thought about this enough to be able to state clearly whether there is an intention or not. Several different factors are at play here. For a group of deputies this may seem to be such an important issue that they are internally convinced that it was necessary for parliament to take it up. Another group of deputies may have considered it necessary to wag their finger at the president so that he would not think that he is unassailable. However, once this was carried onto parliamentary soil, it was my duty to say that this is unnecessary, that it is not a positive deed but, rather, the opposite. Irrespective of whether it touched upon the president as a person, this is a negative deed from the viewpoint of the creation of our country's good image. It is a negative deed also because many deputies spent hours devoting themselves to something that can under no circumstances be called beneficial for our society and general wellbeing and prosperity.

[SME] Do you think that you will be given enough time not only to convince a considerable part of the public

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that your policy is heading in a positive direction but, also, to be able to ascertain yourself whether your policy is successful?

[Kovac] I do not in the least subordinate my activity to the consideration of whether it will help me gain the favor of this or that group of deputies. No office, and hence also the presidential office, is worth betraying one's own ideals. No insults of deputies and no threats that they will dismiss me from the post of president will make me give up those ideals. This does not worry me. My activity pursues a different, and clear, direction, regardless of whether it will arouse the wrath of some group of deputies or not. I would therefore be glad if they realized that it is pointless to intimidate the president by threatening that his term will be shortened or that he will be dismissed. I have never subordinated my conduct to whether it will, or will not, make me retain some office, and I am not going to do it even now. There are other, far more important, values, which must be pursued without paying heed to whether one will retain some office or not. We know many politicians who are faithful to their principles and ideals and who simply leave the stage when they find out that their remaining in office would be detrimental to society and would run counter to general welfare and their ideals. For the time being, I do not see in our country a situation that would compel me to consider my resignation, because I am convinced that democracy in our country will endure. True, it is fragile, like in the other postcommunist countries, but there exists here sufficient strength, goodwill, as well as awareness on the part of many of our citizens that democracy is the greatest gain that we have managed to obtain and that it is worth sacrificing all one's efforts for us to be able to reach also our further targets in the sphere of living standards, cultural development, moral renewal, and our integration into European structures—simply, for us, the Slovak Republic, to become a self-confident element and successful player on the international stage and a positive contribution to it.

Schenk on EU Membership, Relations With Germany

AU2302131395 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 22 Feb 95 p 8

[Article by "ay": "EU Accession Will Not Be Easy For Bratislava"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn, 21 Feb—Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk does not see any alternative to Slovakia's integration into Europe and NATO: EU membership is a "constant factor and a maxim" of Slovak foreign policy, he says.

The government in Bratislava insists on submitting its EU membership application to Brussels by 30 June this year, Prime Minister Meciar announced in his government statement recently. The date, Schenk said in an interview with HANDELSBLATT, has not been determined deliberately. For the Slovak Government it is important to have an intensive dialogue with various European institutions. Bratislava has the problem of having to prepare for Europe without knowing what kind of Europe it should prepare for, since the EU itself is in the process of determining its structures for the next millennium.

Although the dialogue with the EU has been institutionalized through the Association Council—the Association Agreement has been in force since 1 February but was enforced already before that date—one cannot just wait for further developments without acting. The membership application not only demonstrates a willingness to integrate Slovakia into Europe, it also establishes formal data. This is especially the case if the intergovernment conference scheduled for 1996 is postponed, which is not impossible. Then it is all the more important "to participate."

Even if the membership application is submitted before the end of this year, Schenk does not expect Slovakia to be able to join the EU before the year 2000: "And we will unconditionally accept Europe whatever way it may look then," the minister points out. Of course, Slovakia sees the financial advantages that EU membership involves, but the country by no means wants to burden the other EU members: "What is decisive for us is that we are equal partners."

Full EU membership will involve a number of problems for Slovakia, Schenk says. Enormous burdens can be expected, as Slovak companies might not survive the tough competition in the EU. Not only management solutions must be found; there is also the threat of rising unemployment. The question of wage differentiation has not even been mentioned, and the manner in which Slovakia's agriculture can be integrated into EU agricultural policy remains to be seen. If EU agricultural policy is connected with price increases for Slovaks it constitutes a very sensitive issue not only for the EU, but also for Slovakia; he mentions the rejection of EU membership by the rural population in Norway.

The Slovak Government is committed to making every effort to prepare the country for EU membership "as an equal partner." This not only involves adjusting legislative standards and regulations, but also adjusting economic structures. The most import economic goal is to raise the economy and standard of living to a level comparable to that of Europe at that time "by 2010 at the latest." This will be achieved by means of a growth-oriented economic policy with an annual growth of at least 5 percent, continued privatization, and the promotion of foreign trade.

Schenk did not leave any doubt about the fact that Bonn is by far the most important address in the EU, "although we are in the process of establishing a dialogue with all European governments:" "I am convinced that the enlargement and deepening of Europe will further increase the importance of unified Germany." That is

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why, for a country like Slovakia, it is particularly important to see that the FRG unconditionally advocates eastward expansion of the EU.

Before visiting Bonn, the Slovak foreign minister had opened the first honorary consulate in Hamburg. In his view, further honorary consulates—some five—should be established in Germany over the next few years, including Stuttgart and Nuremberg and the eastern German laender. One of the problems to be tackled in this connection is the search for suitable consuls. In the view of the foreign minister, the two countries have no bilateral problems at the moment; economic relations are developing satisfactorily. He was particularly interested in two things: First, in a German-Slovak chamber of commerce being established in Bratislava (at the moment there is an "Office of the Delegate of German Industry," which is being controlled from Prague); and second, he is very interested in a meeting between the two heads of government Kohl and Meciar to take place in the near future. Several agreements on cooperation in the fields of culture and education are ready to be signed.

Schenk is aware of the fact that Slovakia's image in many Western European countries is not particularly good. The minister sees one of the reasons for this to be these countries themselves: "People there judge us much more critically than they do other countries, such as the southern EU members." Of course, there are transformation problems in Slovakia, but these also exist in other reform states; he criticizes the fact that many foreign countries simply do not mention positive developments in Slovakia. Much of the resentment toward Slovakia originates from the time of separation from the Czechs, which came unexpectedly to foreigners, Schenk says.

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Government Says Papers 'Leaking State Secrets'

LD2302173195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the government, newspapers that published details of a plan of short-term economic stabilization measures were leaking state secrets and publishing ideas as though they were facts. Spokesman Elemer Csak expressed the government's surprise over the incident. According to the concepts that have been published, the government would seem to be planning an 11-12 billion forint reduction in welfare spending already this year, family allowances would in the future be means-tested, and social insurance contributions would have to be paid on all incomes.

Jewish Group Protests About 'Neo-Nazi' Group

AU2402091895 Paris AFP in English 2112 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Feb 23 (AFP)— Hungary's main Jewish group Thursday [23 February] slammed the authorities here for allowing a neo-Nazi group to register itself officially following a report by police that arsonists who put fire to a synagogue in January were members of the group.

Police said Thursday that members of a neo-Nazi organisation registered with officials under the name Kabsz (the Eastern Frontline Comrades Federation) had set fire to the synagogue in the eastern town of Debrecen on January 6.

The Mazsihisz, or Federation of Hungarian Jewish Parishes, said in a statement that the neo-Nazi group had posted its intentions by calling itself Kabsz, the name first used in 1944 by a Hungarian fascist organisation which backed a pro-Nazi coup in Hungary during World War II.

The Mazsihisz statement criticised officials for not showing "greater caution," particularly following attempts to revive another wartime pro-Nazi Hungarian group, the Hungarist Movement.

Hungary's Jewish population was "shocked and is at a loss at this most recent attempt to revive institutionalised antisemitism," the group said, calling for the Kabsz to be banned.

Members of the original Kabsz collaborated with Nazi Germany and backed the Hungarian Arrow-Cross Party which helped send 600,000 Hungarian Jews to Nazi death camps.

The Jewish group urged "that new legislation is created to prevent similar registration attempts in the future."

Austrian Chancellor on Relations With Hungary

LD2302230695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Passages contained within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tomorrow in Vienna, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn will take part in the ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the Workers Councils. He will also have the opportunity to meet Chancellor Vranitzky, who has given a short interview to our Vienna correspondent, Peter Zentai. [passage omitted]

[Zentai] I asked Vranitzky whether the domestic political, domestic economic problems, which are proliferating both in Austria and Hungary might not slow down the bilateral cooperation that functioned excellently earlier, whether they will not inhibit the Austrian Government in realizing its promise to be Hungary's advocate in the European Union.

[Vranitzky, in German with superimposed Hungarian translation] "There is no domestic political development in Austria that might in any degree restrain the good relations that have developed with Hungary."

[Zentai] I then asked him: Not even the increasing right-wing pressure?

[Vranitzky] "No, not even that. Because, in Austria there is no question of any kind of right-wing breakthrough. It is true that, while there is increasing activity in domestic political debate, which some right-wing Freedom Party leaders are indeed trying to sharpen as much as possible through rhetoric and other methods, this will not influence Hungarian relations."

[Zentai] Finally, in answer to my remark that in Austria acts of terrorism also appear in the tool kit of the extreme right-wing, and that this could have a paralyzing effect on Austrian external relations, Vranitzky said the following:

[Vranitzky] "That is not so."

Scientists Say Slovak Plant Will Increase Safety

LD2302181695 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Scientific representatives today made their voices heard in connection with safety at the Mochovce nuclear power plant in Slovakia. Our staff members were present at the briefing of the Hungarian Nuclear Society.

[Unidentified correspondent] According to Dr. Zoltan (Szatmari), president of the Hungarian Nuclear Society, the V-213 type of nuclear power plant planned at Mochovce is on the whole like the one at Paks. Both the Paks and the planned Mochovce reactors satisfy the international safety norms. The type of nuclear power plant at Mochovce basically differs from the Chernobyl reactors. Even in case of an accident, the possibility of radioactive pollution reaching long distances is technically excluded because the localization tower existing in both power plants would prevent pollution getting out. The Slovak investors promise that once Mochovce has been set into operation, they will halt the two V-230 type

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blocks at the Bohunice nuclear power plant, which do not contain localization towers. This would mean an overall increase in the safety of the region's nuclear power plants, asserts the Hungarian Nuclear Society. In their opinion, the Hungarian Government has no reason to protest against completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant. Were it nevertheless to do so, it would not only be damaging its own prestige but it would also be harming the country's interests. The situation would be different if Mochovce were to start operating and blocks one and two at Bohunice were not to stop after all, stressed Dr. Zoltan (Szatmari), president of the Society.

Military Leaders Said 'Unable To Change'

AU2302210395 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 21 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by "vereckei": "Reaction to THE WASHINGTON POST Article—Is It the Generals' Way of Thinking That Is Outdated?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The way of thinking of the Hungarian Army's generals has indeed remained unchanged; this is a characteristic of the age. The Warsaw Pact's ideas will remain dominant for those people who were brought up on them, military expert Peter Talas told MAGYAR NEMZET.

We interviewed Talas, member of the Strategic Defense and Research Institute, on Defense Secretary William Perry's weekend statement and the Sunday [19 February] analysis in THE WASHINGTON POST.

As it was reported in many newspapers on 20 February, there is a change in the U.S. arms sales concept. As became clear from Perry's statement, the United States is willing from now on to sell offensive weapons to Central-East European countries. THE WASHINGTON POST article on the military situation of the region's countries is partly in connection with this. The article mentions, among other things, that actual civilian control over the Armed Forces has not been implemented anywhere except the Czech Republic. It also mentions that the military forces that were created on the Warsaw Pact's offensive doctrine cannot convert their way of thinking to NATO's defensive concept, and at least 10 years would be needed for this.

In connection with this, Talas said that in the case of the corps of generals, the lack of change does not mean that they are dishonest; the simple fact is that this is what they are used to. The high-ranking officers can also see this and perceive it as a tragedy; however, they are unable to change. The Washington newspaper is right in this, Talas said. As he put it, it is not enough for [Defense Minister] Gyorgy Keleti to change over to a different attitude. This should also happen among the Army's higher leadership. However, for this to happen, a generation has to leave the first line. The situation is different among the young officers.

To the newspaper's suggestion that the Army, while many young officers have left it in recent years, kept the aging political colonels, Talas said that many political officers have indeed preserved their positions. At the same time, this is a personal issue in many ways. Mainly those people left who can also find a livelihood in civilian life while those who would not be able to do this had to stay.

To the newspaper's statement that no civilian control has been established, Talas said: Civilian control is very different in every country, even within the NATO countries. Its basics do already exist in Hungary but it has to be perfected. In this context, Talas did not think it important that the Defense Ministry is employing an increasing number of soldiers among its staff. He stated that he can see more deficiencies in the implementation of the parliamentary decisions. It is not possible to know to what extent the legislature is able to look into the Defense Ministry's finances and the use of the budget. As to the suggestion that Romania has the biggest chance for NATO membership among the former Warsaw Pact countries, as was also reported by another newspaper, he said that he has a different opinion on this. Romania undoubtedly has a geostrategic advantage over Hungary; however, Poland occupies the first place from this point of view. The Czech Republic is in a simpler situation and could join more easily because it has a NATO neighbor. According to Talas, in terms of geographical situation, the Baltic states also precede Romania. He also added that he cannot see Romania's increased rating as has been reported by NEPSZABADSAG.

On the change of the U.S. arms sales concept, Talas said that, according to this, Hungary has been completely removed from the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] list.

To our question on a possible arms race, he said that in the coming four to five years, he is not worried about a spiral starting off because the U.S. weapons are extremely expensive and the region's countries are unable to buy large amounts of them. At any rate, the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] agreement that defines the amount of various military technological equipment puts a limit on this. Apart from the Yugoslav successor states and Austria, all countries that are important for us from this point of view have signed this agreement, he added.

Draft Hungarian-Slovak Agreement Previewed

AU2302143695 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Feb 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Gabor Czene: "Hungarian-Slovak National Minority Joint Committee?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NEPSZABADSAG has been informed that the Hungarian draft of the national minority agreement to be signed in conjunction with the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty proposes setting up a joint committee.

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The committee, which would verify the implementation of agreement's decisions, would include members delegated by the two countries' governments and representatives of the minorities. According to our information, the basic treaty on "good-neighborly relations and friendly cooperation" between Hungary and Slovakia contains general provisions, including the passage on the inviolability of borders. According to the Hungarian draft, the treaty would be good for 10 years.

If neither side cancels the treaty in writing at least one year before its expiration date, then it will automatically be extended by five years. The national minority agreement, laying down the rights of the Slovak minority in Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, would come into force together with the treaty.

The Hungarian standard text lists in detail the rights necessary to preserve the identity of national minorities in the areas of culture, education, religion, and language use. The draft confirms that Hungary ensures the financial conditions for the operation of the national and local self-governments of Hungary's Slovaks. At the same time, Slovakia helps the Hungarian minority to organize itself and set up local and regional self-administration. The two sides' state or local government will refrain from changing the public administration structure so as to make it unfavorable for the national minorities.

The draft considers it necessary to set up a joint committee that would verify the implementation of the agreement's decisions. The committee would include members delegated by the two governments and the national minorities' representatives.

The joint committee would hold sessions as needed but at least once a year alternating in Slovakia and Hungary. The committee's task is to discuss the current issues of the two minorities, assess the implementation of the obligations laid down in the agreement, and prepare and accept recommendations in connection with implementing the agreement.

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Oleksy Names Luczak as Deputy Prime Minister

LD2302211495 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party coalition has agreed on the complete composition of the new government, which will be presented to President Lech Walesa on Monday [27 February], Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy said after a meeting of the coalition.

[Correspondent Przemylaw Barbrich] There is one deputy prime minister, Aleksander Luczak, in my cabinet—this was the way the Sejm speaker and the coalition candidate for prime minister forestalled journalists' questions about responsibilities given to Grzegorz Kolodko. The speaker added that Professor Kolodko would be appointed finance minister and government plenipotentiary for the reform of the economic center, and would also head the Council of Ministers economic committee.

Oleksy also said that the nomination for the new police chief remained unsigned although it should have been confirmed. He also expressed hope that Waldemar Pawlak's cabinet would continue until the change of government.

Asked by journalists if he would resign his mission if he did not find a compromise with the president, Oleksy said that he hoped such a compromise would be reached. If this did not happen the decision would be taken by the Sejm.

Foreign Ministry Protests DPRK Expulsions

LD2302133595 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Foreign Ministry [MSZ] has issued a firm protest against North Korea's demand that Poland withdraw from its territory officers serving as part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission [NNSC], supervising the demarcation line between the two Korean states.

According to the North Korean authorities, the commission, which was set up after the signing of the armistice agreement on the Korean peninsula in 1953, has lost its mandate and there is no more need for its continuing activity.

However, Director Jerzy Pomianowski from the MSZ, does not rule out the need to evacuate the Polish officers, which would not mean, however, the formal completion of the mission.

[Begin Pomianowski recording] The embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has issued a note which includes a deadline for our presence—our physical presence in Pyongyang—which is the end of February this year, that is 28 February. After this deadline, we have been told, all forms of logistical help, which according to the armistice treaty must be provided by the host country, will be withdrawn. We are talking here about the power supply, food, and technical services.

Of course, this would render impossible the activity of Polish officers there and would also constitute a serious threat to their health and lives. All the more so because a phrase has also been used saying that the Polish officers will be treated as illegal immigrants on DPRK territory. These are very strong statements when it comes to diplomatic correspondence. Our reaction was immediate diplomatic measures in order to inform the international community.

Finally, we have carried out consultations with representatives of the United States, South Korea, as well as China. All our interlocutors supported our position in this matter, namely that until the armistice setup is replaced by another mechanism, it has to continue. Consequently, we still have the duty to continue our presence there. [end recording]

Church Withdraws From Constitution Compromise

LD2302224795 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Roman Catholic Church has withdrawn consent to an entry in the new constitution that the church is separate from the state. Such a compromise formulation was consented to yesterday by representatives of all the churches that are taking part in the work of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly. Parliamentarians again failed to succeed in the preparation of the article speaking of state-church relations.

Yesterday, representatives of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostalists, and the Church of the Assemblies of Christ [as heard] agreed to the clause that churches and denominatonal associations are separate from the state and also make use of autonomy and independence in the implementation of their tasks. This was an attempt to find a compromise. Meanwhile, today, Father Professor Jozef Krukowski said that there is no acceptance from the hierarchy of the Catholic Church for the formulation "separation." He explained that the earlier consent was wrongly understood.

[Begin Father Jozef Krukowski recording, representative of the Polish Episcopate, identified by caption] There also exists a justified fear that in the future this formula of separation would be given such a negative meaning as it had in the not too distant past. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The church recalls that in the past, with such a formulation, the state interfered in its internal affairs. Professor Krukowski feels that the questioned formulation is ambiguous and dangerous.

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[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Is this not blowing this up out of proportion?

[Krukowski] Oh no. Experience indicates that a change in policy in relation to the church at this still not stabilized stage is very much possible. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The representative of the Episcopate does not doubt that a compromise is still possible. For the time being, however, the parliamentarians have not succeeded in working out a formulation that would satisfy everyone. There are as many as 14 proposals for the article specifying state-church relations. The deputies discussed this today for almost four hours.

[Begin Aleksander Kwasniewski recording, chairman of the Constitutional Commission] This discussion is important in as much as a coming together of the sides may be clearly seen. It could be that the dispute now only relates to not so much words as associations, or else the reservations that are associated with particular words. So, if a compromise could be found here then I feel that these hours have not only not been wasted, but may also be altogether a plane for the construction of a wide consensus around the Constitution. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Work on the disputed clause will be continued in two weeks time. Every decision of the commission relating to the draft of the future constitution will still have to be confirmed by the National Assembly [Sejm and Senate in joint session].

Police Protest Spreads, Generates Reaction

WS2302143795 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Feb 95 p 11

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Extraordinary Police Situation: Will Prime Minister Pawlak Call a Government Session?"]

[FBIS Translated Text]*Minister Andrzej Milczanowski appealed to Prime Minister Pawlak on 21 February to urgently call a session of the Council of Ministers [RM] to discuss postulates raised by Police Solidarity. He was supportcd by Deputy Prime Minister [and Finance Minister] Grzegorz Kolodko, with whom Minister Milczanowski met on Tuesday to report on the ongoing protest. We have unofficially learned that the heads of the National Headquarters of Police [KGP] claim the current developments have not had a precedent ever since the police department was established in 1990.*

During the meeting with Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, Milczanowski stressed the need to develop solutions "matching the budgetary means of the state." Both concluded, however, that only RM had the powers to do this. On Wednesday, the Government Press Office knew nothing of the prime minister's plans to hold a cabinet meeting.

At noon on Wednesday, trade unionists met with representatives of KGP and the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. Colonel Edward Stopczyk, the interior minister's representative in charge of contacts with trade unions, presented the unionists with a statement Milczanowski issued after his meeting with Kolodko and the appeal addressed to the prime minister. Talks were rescheduled for Thursday.

As RZECZPOSPOLITA learned from Jan Malek, head of the National Committee of Police Solidarity, the protest has been supported by the Presidium of the National Committee of Police Solidarity in Gdansk, Solidarity '80 of the Czestochowa Region, the Regional Board of ZNP [expansion unknown] in Szczecin, the Boards of Penitentiary Employees in Chelm, Krasnystaw, and Wlodawa, Border Guard Officers Solidarity in Krosno Odrzanskie, and the Regional Council of the Union of Labor in Lublin. Trade unions of Czech and Slovak police are in solidarity with the Polish policemen. The Police Trade Union (GdP) in Germany has informed the German interior minister and the press that the absolutely necessary cooperation with East European police to combat transborder and organized crime may break down due to the current economic condition of those states. The Polish unions "Are ringing their alarm bells. The Polish Government is impeding police operations despite the fact that the crime rate grows continually." GdP Head Herman Lutz states it is in the interest of the security of the entire continent to have well-trained and adequately equipped police in Poland. He also says that support from West Europe is absolutely necessary in times of crises.

Since Tuesday, 48 voivodships (Nowy Sacz has just joined) and three police academies have been flagged. Only Warsaw did not join the protest, although it does support the unionists' postulates.

Moreover, Solidarity of Civilian Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is demanding that the issue of salaries in this public sector professional group be resolved.

Media Reports About 'CIA Agents' Examined

WS2402132895 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Feb 95 p 30

[Article by Sylwester Walczak in New York: "Who Is Favored by the CIA?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week, the U.S. newsmagazine TIME published a report on close ties between two Cenzin employees—Zbigniew Tarka and Tadeusz Koperwas—and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. On Tuesday, the TIME story was picked up by ZYCIE WARSZAWY under the caption "Two Cenzin Employees Were CIA Agents."

Information that Cenzin employees Tadeusz Koperwas and Zbigniew Tarka had been selling Polish and East European weaponry, subsequently dispatched to various parts of the world, surfaced now and again in Poland and the United States for at least two years. Many facts

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related to their operations were disclosed at a New York trial of five Poles charged with smuggling arms to Iraq. More information was revealed by Ronald Hendron in his book *The Rifle Trap* [Karabinowa Pulapka]. From unofficial talks with high-ranking officers of the Polish Army, one could learn that Koperwas and Tarka were at the time allegedly participating in the Iran-Contra affair, in which they were said to have supplied weapons to the Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

It was difficult to separate allegation from fact in those reports. It may, however, be assumed that some of the information published by TIME regarding Koperwas and Tarka's role in supplying arms to the Afghan mujahedins and the their role in intercepting samples of the most modern Soviet weapon systems, used in the Polish Army at the time, for U.S. intelligence is true. Even more so since the TIME article quotes secret documents it supposedly has in its possession. THE WASHINGTON POST also wrote about the Cenzin sales of Soviet weaponry to the Americans. Hendron wrote about long-standing and close-knit cooperation between the two men with Captain Heiko Luikengo, who shipped arms to many parts of the world. The liaison was also brought up during the "rifle trial."

ZYCIE WARSZAWY claims Tarka and Koperwas "were CIA agents" and that only the intervention of U.S. intelligence allowed them to avoid being arrested along with other "riflemen" in Frankfurt in March 1992. Court files hardly confirm this. The arrests took place on the last day of negotiations, when Tarka and Koperwas had already long left Frankfurt—they had settled their part of the "deal" with U.S. customs officers on the very first day and immediately returned to Poland. Contrary to the ZYCIE WARSZAWY report, there are no documents to prove they had been detained and released after 24 hours.

On the other hand, however, members of the arrested "riflemen's" families told some journalists that Tarka and Koperwas did have some ties to the CIA and that they were in its good graces. Unlike ZYCIE WARSZAWY, TIME did not state they were both CIA "agents" or "collaborators." It only said that they did business with and rendered services for the U.S. agency, which showed its appreciation by having investigations against them dropped.

The issue of the investigation is the most dubious part of the TIME item. The weekly makes a reference to Koperwas and Tarka's alleged participation in a $15-million shipment of arms to Iraq in 1992. It seems the authors had in mind the "rifle affair" which, as we know, did not involve any shipments except for 100 rifle samples dispatched to New York. Documents from court proceedings in the "riflemen" case did not in any way state that official charges had been brought against Tarka and Koperwas or that any court case was filed against them. Their names were mentioned several times in the courtroom when evidence incriminating the five Poles was presented. That was all. One gets the impression that as far as the "rifle affair" is concerned, TIME knows the bells are chiming somewhere, but it knows not in which church.

A spokesman for the CIA refused to make any comment on Tarka and Koperwas. The TIME editorial office has not returned my calls.

Power of Wachowski in Walesa's Cabinet Grows

WS2202141695 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 19 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Piotr Zaremba: "Vice President Wachowski]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ever since Mieczyslaw Wachowski became head of the president's cabinet in the summer of 1991, his powers have continued to grow. He participated, and is alleged to have once led, talks on forming a government. He has caused many of Walesa's closest colleagues to leave the Belvedere. Thus far, he has always won.

Wachowski made a discreet entry into the political scene when he became head of Walesa's cabinet in the summer of 1991. Lech Walesa openly spoke of the role he played in the formation of Olszewski's government. He advised party leaders to talk about the formation of the cabinet with Wachowski. "We do not have anything to talk about with him," said the leader of the Liberal-Democrat Congress, Donald Tusk. In the end, Wachowski did not become the architect of that government, but an impression was left nonetheless.

In early 1992, even those who were not in the know began to catch on. In an article published in GAZETA WYBORCZA, "The Leader; The End of a Chapter," a group of Walesa's top former colleagues—Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Jacek Merkel, Arkadiusz Rybicki, and Krzysztof Wyszkowski—presented a very grave account of relations within the Belvedere. All of them agreed Wachowski was the president's insuperable companion and confidant. They claimed he was simply...

Walesa's Bad Spirit

Wachowski was to monitor all incoming mail and the president's contacts, cutting him off from anyone he considered a foe. Politicians reporting on the situation were not certain whether he had the president's approval, or whether Walesa was ensnared. Kaczynski stressed Wachowski's great interest in the military and secret services. The head of the president's cabinet had regular contacts with then Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk and read reports prepared by the Military Intelligence Services. He also attended meetings of the National Defense Committee with the president. He had access to top state secrets.

Later on, in his book entitled THE JUNE LEFTIST [LEWY CZERWCOWY], Kaczynski launched a more

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bitter attack. He said Wachowski put on Walesa's slippers for him to gain his favor. He also made allegations Wachowski was an agent of the secret services during the times of the People's Republic.

The issue of Wachowski's influence on Walesa was brought up by Defense Minister Jan Parys in March 1992. He first accused unnamed politicians of political scheming within the Army, and then pointed to the head of Walesa's cabinet, blaming him for denying access to Walesa. Wachowski attended a meeting of Jerzy Milewski, head of the National Security Office [BBN], with General Tadeusz Wilecki who was appointed—behind the minister's back—as head of General Staff. During an investigation into the so-called Parys case, the president's closest colleague was summoned to a committee hearing. He did not say anything interesting.

During the crisis leading to Olszewski's downfall, Walesa no longer delegated Wachowski as his representative. Yet Wachowski continued to take part in important political talks. This is how Christian National Union [ZChN] politician Stefan Niesiolowski relayed the pressure exerted by the president on his party at the time to persuade it to join Pawlak's government: "The president tried to persuade us, even the...

Vice President Himself

... tried, but to no avail."

As he remained by Walesa's side, his powers continually grew. Even though Janusz Ziolkowski was the head of the Chancellory, the cabinet head supervised the administrative department, which gave him control over the entire Belvedere staff. He influenced Walesa just as much as Press Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski.

At the same time, he developed contacts with politicians—those who wanted to have good relations with the Belvedere went hunting with Wachowski. That is what Henryk Goryszewski, deputy prime minister in Suchocka's government, did; Prime Minister Pawlak also followed the example. One of the leaders of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] told a ZYCIE WARSZAWY correspondent how once SLD formed a government with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], Wachowski was obstinate in inviting him to his house for an impromptu party. Our interlocutor declined, but many others became very close friends with the president's colleague. The leaders did not praise him in public, except for Jacek Kuron from the Freedom Union, who, in his book entitled *My Soup* [Moja Zupa]—called him a "very nice man" who was unfairly demonized. Privately, they accuse him of a lust for power and fear him slightly, especially as—apart from politicians—Wachowski usually plays with Army generals.

He became the topic of various rumors. In the beginning of 1994 it was widely thought that he would become the new head of BBN, which would allow him to let rightist politicians into the Chancellory. He is alleged to have played a vital role in nominating Marian Zacharski as head of intelligence last summer. By that time it was rumored he was to become minister of internal affairs. Soon afterwards, his position strengthened considerably when Drzycimski was dismissed. From then on, the president had only one trusted adviser. Rumors of his departure began to circulate anew in the fall of 1994. "If it means there will be more sausage in Poland, I will leave," he said in one of his very rare public statements.

His dismissal is alleged to be a necessary precondition for Walesa to gain the support of rightist politicians and part of the church hierarchy. Several rightist leaders claim otherwise. "Not Wachowski, but Walesa is the problem," assured Center Accord President Jaroslaw Kaczynski. "Let us do away with the myth of the good czar and evil Wachowski," declared ZChN leader Ryszard Czarnecki.

Deputies of the Sejm of the current term were outraged when Wachowski flew on a military plane to watch a motor race in Wroclaw. He retorted they should rather show concern for the plane trips made by leading SLD and PSL politicians. It was speculated whether he should be summoned before a committee investigating the "Drawsko affair"—he was one of the participants. The idea was abandoned.

Today, Wachowski is at war with all of the Belvedere officers: Lech Falandysz, Janusz Ziolkowski, and Andrzej Zakrzewski. He even used his authority to deny Falandysz the right to use a Belvedere car.

Military Relations With Neighbors Outlined

WS2402114295 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by "Z.L.": "Neighbors in Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text]*Just as in the old days, our soldiers are taking part in maneuvers with our neighbors at the Czech military range in Libava. Two weeks ago, the Czechs were using our equipment and military support during maneuvers held near Wedrzyn, Poland. Cooperation with neighboring armies is most animated in the proximity of our southern borders. "We have really moved beyond purely courteous relations," says Press Spokesman of the General Staff Colonel Zdzislaw Czekierda. Our contacts with the Slovaks have also intensified this year. This is due not only to meetings held at the highest military levels. Our neighbors from beyond the Carpathian mountains are seeking contacts with Polish Army commanders so that they can verify the worth of the new Slovak Army, the cadres of which were kept in the Czech shadow for so long. Officers and servicemen renewed contacts during the famed "Bridge of Cooperation" maneuvers held in Biedrusko last year. They now share the excitement of the entire Visegrad Group.*

Due to a lack of resources, any Polish-Ukrainian cooperation, which is not provided for in the protocol, has all but vanished. It is a great pity. Our officers find it

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astonishing that there are no psychological or ideological barriers in contacts with their Ukrainian counterparts. Poles claim the lack of inhibitions is due to the understanding of the westerly route of the Dnepr. Perhaps joint maneuvers will be held this year for a good start. As with the remaining neighboring states, we have signed a deal on military cooperation with Ukraine. Among officers on both sides, there are enthusiasts of close relations who are ready to forget historical conflicts. With an eye on the future, about a dozen Polish officers have begun studying Ukrainian in one of the most distinguished language study centers in Lodz. It is still difficult to predict the outcome of a reconnaissance carried out recently by Belarusian officers and bilateral meetings between heads of staff. The General Staff says we have warm feelings for Lithuania, which, after a lengthy silence, has recently come up with an extremely daring suggestion of establishing a joint battalion for carrying out peace missions.

We are also encouraging—albeit without any vivid response as yet—Russian soldiers from Kaliningrad oblast to cooperate in the border regions. "Unfortunately, the time is not yet ripe in terms of psychology. The paralyzing mentality of an isolated outpost of an empire still predominates," say military analysts.

Astonishment and Inferiority Complex

Once the iron curtain was lifted, the first carefully selected officers from the West visited Polish officers in their homes, in an atmosphere of controlled spontaneity. Once both sides recovered from the initial shock, all they had time for was an exchange of courtesies. Only when the contacts became more regular did the "European" guests admit they were astounded to see the civilized conditions in which their Polish colleagues lived: home libraries and collections of the newest rock records, some very impressive. You should have then seen our young lieutenants and captains when they returned from their reciprocal visits. They did not expect that they would cure themselves of their inferiority complex so quickly—except for the disproportions in remuneration and the effects of being compelled to study Russian in the past.

The increasingly frequent direct contacts and maneuvers brought with them the currently institutionalized fashion to study foreign languages. "Over the next few years, we should be able to overcome the linguistic barriers, particularly at the basic levels of command," say General Staff officers.

The Germans have been in the lead in 'border region' military contacts with our Army at least since 1991. Visits made by the 11th Division of the Tank Cavalry in Zagan and the 5th Borderland Mechanized Division [Kresowa Dywizja Zmechanizowana] in Gubin at military units in Dresden at swearing in ceremonies and other celebrations, and reciprocal visits made by the Germans to Poland may serve as a symbolic model. The contacts are no longer uncommon: both sides send their observers and operational units to maneuvers, the military administrations have well-established contacts, suggestions were made to hold joint command-staff maneuvers. Like the Germans are on land, the Dutch are seeking contacts along the sea borders. "They are increasingly interested in meeting those who operate in the Baltic Sea region as they do."

Weapons Plant Changing to Nonmilitary Production

95EP0042B Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish No 4, 22 Jan 95 p 26

[Article by (GAO): "From Tanks to Civilian Production: Until Recently the Bumar-Labedy Plant Used to Sell 90 Percent of Its Products to the Military; Now It Is Only 30 Percent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In mid-December 1994 Bumar-Labedy became the first Polish weponss plant to be awarded the International Certificate of Quality ISO 9002. The work on introducing the quality control system was started in August 1991.

To Bumar that was a particularly difficult period of exploring ways of surviving after the collapse of the eastern market. It turned out that the arms industry could not cope without assistance. It was easier to find allies among bankers than among ministry officials. The bankers provided the capital for relieving some of the plant's debt, paying off some of the smaller creditors, and converting some departments to civilian production. Within two years Bumar-Labedy, Poland's major tank manufacturer, began to make dump trucks, power shovels, and derricks. The "Norweg," a modernized derrick, appeared on construction sites, along with huge highway and cross-country cranes. For a year now modernized Brawal power shovels have been a major success of the Bumar plant on the export market. For these shovels the plant was awarded three gold medals at the International Fair in Poznan, and in 1993 the Brawal 4011 was granted the "Poland Now" distinction. Earlier models, such as the 1611 hydraulic shovel, are operating under most difficult climatic and geological conditions, among others in Russian extractive industry in Siberia. Bumar-Labedy Machinery Works, S.A., is also manufacturing side-loaders for the mining industry.

The conversion of the arms plant to civilian production was also to be promoted by manufacturing a cross-country vehicle and the Euclid heavy dump truck with a load capacity of 32 tons on behalf of VME, an international corporation. To meet world standards, Labedy concluded longterm cooperation agreements with such well-known makers of construction machinery as Krupp and Faun.

But tanks still continue to be a major product of Bumar at Labedy. Thus while 10 years ago their sales were about 300 a year and in the early 1990s not even one could be sold, the impasse was broken by the PT 91 hard-alloy

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plated tank. In 1993, 10 such tanks were ordered by the Ministry of National Defense. In the opinion of experts, the PT 91 is of a quality comparable to that of its foreign counterparts, while its price is only a fraction of them, so that the chances for its export are good.

For nearly two years the plant has been operating as a joint-stock Treasury company. It has been broken up into six autonomous departments. It is envisaged to set aside one-half of its output for the needs of the military. Even now nearly two-thirds are produced for civilian use. In mid-1994 Bumar-Labedy concluded bank agreements with its main creditors, the Agency for Industrial Development and the BPH S.A. At Bumar it is admitted that the repayment of its restructured debt will hinge on military orders. The company is also placing great hopes in the activation of the program for highway construction in Poland.

As early as in the 1980s, the Gliwice department of Bumar-Labedy had employed 12,000. Three years ago that number shrank to 9,000 and at present it is just one-half as many, and the average wage paid there is about 4 million old zlotys gross (400 new zlotys) monthly.

Hall, Bugaj Define Contemporary Left Wing

95EP0039A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 3, 21 Jan 95 p 16

[Article by Ryszard Bugaj and Aleksander Hall: "Feet Entangled in the Thicket: Where Is the Left? Where the Right?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Leftism is accused of being bankrupt along with the PRL [former Polish People's Republic], utopian, obstructing the needed reforms of the country, and lastly opposing the Roman Catholic Church and national tradition. Thus, what is the Left like nowadays, and how can leftist thinking in this country be defined? These were the questions we asked, in starting a series of articles on the subject, of Ryszard Bugaj, the chairman of the Labor Union, a party which expects to be a new kind of the Left, uncontaminated by the past, and Aleksander Hall, the chairman of the Conservative Party and one of the sharpest critics of the leftist manner of thinking and governing (Ed.).

* * *

Ryszard Bugaj:

The division into the Right and the Left has quite recently been questioned as inadequate for characterizing the identities of political parties and sympathies. But that questioning was motivated by expedient political objectives rather than by intellectual curiosity. It is a fact that we are again characterizing the political scene by placing the various political parties along the Right-Left axis.

But identifying them in terms of these categories is not enough. The more so considering that in analyses and public awareness the Left and the Right are not uniformly defined. Some, in describing the political scene, analyze the kind of answers given by the various parties in response to a political questionnaire, while others focus chiefly on the historical traditions of these politically different parties. The result is confusion. This is due to both 40 years of Communism, which presented itself as the social Left, and the last few years, during which the Communist parties in Europe transformed themselves wholesale into "the democratic Left." That is surely why L. Walesa speaks of the "left foot" when referring to postcommunist groupings.

When the parties identifying themselves as leftist are viewed from the analytic standpoint, it might be assumed in theory that a Communist democratic (independence-minded) Left did exist. But this sounds doubtful because it is impossible to find a common and cohesive set of values linking equally, e.g., Stalinist Russia and democratic Sweden under a social-democratic government. The animus of Polish Communists [while in power] against the Polish socialists from the PPS [Polish Socialist Party] is simply incomprehensible. I thus think that Communism (in practice rather than as a Marxist utopia) must above all be defined as a pathological system of political power.

But acceptance of this definition cannot provide a ready-made alibi, not even for those who had never anything in common with Communism or even battled it but who nevertheless profess leftist ideas. No, because choosing leftist values (like any other values) involves a certain risk. After the Gulag era no one can afford to ignore the arguments aimed against the leftist option.

Being leftist means, it seems to me, liking to live in a society in which differences in material situation among people are smaller rather than greater, in which anyone who gets in trouble (even if through his own fault) receives assistance from the society, as opposed to a social system under which the proverbial "rat race" encourages the basest instincts. Being leftist also means attachment to the principle of social consensus and giving the majority (without any added conditions) the right to take many decisions on behalf of the (local, worker, civil) community.

But the meaning of the Left, just like that of the Right, is best reflected in its choice of the social, economic, and philosophical values which it champions, values which can be convincingly expounded but cannot be unequivocally proved—a choice made to some extent through the prism of accepted axiological assumptions.

Above all, the Left follows an optimistic vision of man and tends to attribute quite a few evils to "the system." The Right, in contrast, sees evil as lodged immanently in human nature. In other words, the Left believes that the world ("the system") should be purposively changed,

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while the Right tends to believe in the existence of a "natural" state of things, of laws whose operation should not be tampered with.

The Left believes that economic growth proceeds smoothly and democracy performs harmoniously when the differences in the material status of people are limited. The Right, on the contrary, views marked differences in material status as a necessary stimulus of growth, and it views attempts to limit these differences as blows against freedom (and democracy).

The Left trusts in "the wisdom of the people." The Right is suspicious and relies on various safeguards to prevent the translation of social will into decisions of the government.

The Left views the market as a vital instrument in regulating the economy but assumes that in certain domains and situations it needs to be corrected by means of state policy. The Right accepts the market as a basically omnipotent economic mechanism and assumes that any intervention of the government in the market is bad.

This list could be continued. But in order to define more unequivocally the nature of the Left an attempt must be made to show how the above "guidelines" are translated into the language of specifics. Here I would like to cite just one specific example: taxes.

The Left is more socially conscious and convinced that the government should not avoid supporting growth processes in the economy, and hence it certainly is more skeptically disposed than the Right to demands for tax reductions. Moreover, being opposed to major differences in personal incomes, the Left is certainly willing to accept more progressive taxes than the Right. All this is, of course, relative and linked to claims that in Poland (as compared with [West] Europe), taxes are not high but place a special burden on low- and middle-income groups. Hence, it cannot be supposed that in a different situation the Left would still be opposed to cutting taxes and making them less progressive.

Lastly, it should be said that nowadays being a leftwinger does not mean accepting an integral position.

Aleksander Hall:

The basic question is whether the concepts of the Left and the Right are adequate to describing the present Polish reality. Not so long ago Adam Michnik claimed that ideological concepts, increasingly less adequate for interpreting the events occurring in the stable democracies of the Western world, are totally inadequate for the analysis of problems with which the countries emerging from a totalitarian system must battle.

In his opinion, the concepts of the Right and the Left not only do not explain anything but complicate understanding the reality. This is the polar opposite of the view that the dispute between the Left and the Right is the key to understanding modern Poland. In this bipolar vision of the world the Left represents the forces of evil and the Right the forces of good. I believe that both views are wrong. Adam Michnik is mistaken in questioning the adequacy of the concepts of the Left and the Right for defining the ideological, political, and economic problems of Poland. One cannot ignore either the fact that political camps in modern Poland define their identities precisely in terms of the concepts of the Left and the Right.

Nowadays in Poland there is no united bloc of the Left nor a leftist doctrine with which leftist-minded persons in general could identify themselves. But this does not mean that the Left in Poland is weak. After several dozen years of socialist indoctrination, leftist views are widespread among the public. The political forces referring directly to leftist traditions and values dominate the Polish political scene nowadays. Let me try to enumerate the views most characteristic of the leftist approach to national issues in Poland.

1. The Economy

Supporters of the Left view the free market with mistrust. They are worried by discrepancies in the material situation of people and by the predominance of private ownership. They are much more concerned about the redistribution of national income than about the ways of spurring economic growth and generating wealth. They are in favor of equalizing social differences through governmental measures and chiefly through a progressive tax policy aimed against individuals with higher incomes. The leftists have accepted privatization as a necessary evil. They tend to view private ownership as at most equal to other modes of ownership and not as the foundation of a healthy economy and social order. The supporters of leftist views usually support protectionist policies and government intervention. They fear an excessive presence of foreign capital, and they oppose reprivatization [restitution of nationalized property].

2. The Political System

The related projects of the parties defining themselves as leftist display many elements in common:

—Support of a parliamentary-cabinet system, with predominance of the unicameral parliament over the other branches of power.

—Desire for an explicit church-state separation.

—Constitutional safeguards for a broad variety of social rights.

3. A Claimant Attitude Toward the Government

As viewed by leftist-minded people, in modern Poland the individual is largely relieved of the obligation of caring for his own welfare, improving himself on his own, and increasing his skills on his own, since he is the above all the object of governmental actions. It is precisely the institutions of the state that are duty-bound to

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provide the individual with decent living conditions, work, and social protection. The supporters of leftist views refuse to accept the fact that the old system is bankrupt and the state cannot exercise the duties which the socialist state had promised to exercise.

4. Attitude Toward the Past

A substantial segment of the leftists identifying themselves with the [two ruling parties, the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party] SLD and PSL, are nostalgic for the PRL [People's Republic of [Poland] era. But only a few would publicly defend the totalitarian system and the criminal acts perpetrated in the name of socialism. In the opinion of the Left, the motives prompting commitment to that system are nevertheless not to be condemned. Many believe that at present attempts are being made to replace one utopia with another, capitalist one, which has also, in their opinion, failed to pass the test of history. Hence also leftists in Poland are prone to explore some third road between the two systems.

5. The Adversary

It is the Right, both the Right defining themselves chiefly by its economic liberalism and the Right championing the traditional vision of a society in which an important role is played by the conservative system of values, with the nation being the most important community and the Roman Catholic Church being an institution that not only shapes individual conscience but also participates in public life and influences legislation and politics. Leftists fear nationalism and clericalism. They view a society shackled by conventions and dependent on traditional authority as a threat to liberty.

The views mentioned above do not form a doctrine. There are leftists who treat them selectively. Of certainty, a highly important factor accounting for differences within the Polish Left is the dispute about the [accomplishments, if any of the] PRL. Nevertheless, such views are fairly common among the Polish society and their genesis is undoubtedly leftist. What is leftism in political terms? The SLD, the PSL, and a segment of Freedom Union. Leftist economic ideas also have many supporters among NSZZ Solidarity, KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland), and parties forming the so-called Secretariat of Center-Right Groupings.

The Left is nowadays a major force in Poland. Unfortunately, its notions of the economy, the government, and the place of the individual in the community are a great obstacle to our country's utilization of the opportunity afforded us by history following the collapse of the old system in 1989.

Country's Vision of Role in EU Discussed

95EP0045A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Jan 95 p 24

[Article by Maria Wagrowska: "The European Movement's Views on Poland's Closer Relations With the West: We Must Have Our Own Vision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland still does not have its own vision of the future European Union and of its participation in that organization, as emphasized by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the government commissioner for European integration and foreign aid, at the First Conference of the Polish Council of the European Movement (PRRE) (14 January in Warsaw). The PRRE's membership consists of several dozen prominent public figures and its objective is to "support the aspirations of the Polish Republic to include our country in the structures and systems of the European Union."

This opinion of the government commissioner, who announced that Poland has declared its intent to participate in the conference on reviewing the Maastricht treaty, which is to be convened in 1996, was shared by all the other speakers. The Council's Secretary General Zygmunt Skorzynski stressed at the very outset, "It is precisely the goal of our conference to initiate discussion of ways of speeding up the integrative process and developing such a vision."

Black Friday

Many are right now complaining that Poland has experienced a "Black Friday," that the resignation of Andrzej Olechowski has left our country without a minister of foreign affairs just when the international situation is so difficult. "I want to believe," declared PRRE Chairman, Freedom Union Deputy Andrzej Wielowieyski, "that the current [political] turmoil in our country will not delay integration with the West." He added, "After all, Central Europe still remains a 'gray zone,' to which the big powers may at most grant dubious guarantees."

"A day after 'Black Friday,'" declared Freedom Union Deputy Piotr Nowina-Konopka, "I find that the only solution would be to nominate [as the new foreign minister] some unconventional person who would be able to achieve the needed consensus. The well-known intellectual Jacek Wozniakowski has pointed out that, following 'Black Friday,' Poland's image in the eyes of our partners may readily worsen."

No Alternative

There is no alternative to economic and political integration with West Europe, as Andrzej Wielowieyski and many other speakers emphasized. "No one in this country has formulated, or even tried to formulate, any such alternative," declared the Chairman of the Sejm Committee for the European Treaty Jan Borkowski (PSL), and claimed that the integration with Europe is inevitable. "This process affects us all, even if at times we do not realize it. A Pole who travels across internal boundaries in West Europe often believes that the absence of border checks is due to the similar levels of prosperity of these countries, but in reality it is due to their integration." Further, Borkowski claimed, "Anybody who has in one way or another had similar experiences ceases to be an observer and becomes a participant." Zdzislaw Najder opposed the claims that

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there is no alternative to the integration. He argued, "By making this assumption beforehand, we avoid intellectual and organizational exertion and, in the final analysis, we become passive participants."

At this Warsaw conference, as at other similar meetings, some people asked whether the closer relationship with the EU, and subsequently membership therein, might not mean loss of national sovereignty. Others said that in no way is the participation in such pro-Soviet organizations as the Warsaw Treaty or CEMA comparable with participation in NATO and EU, because in the former case participation was compulsory whereas now we can only speak of voluntary transfer of sovereign rights. As one speaker stressed, "Any transfer of such rights to supranational organizations can only be a sovereign decision of the Polish state."

Piotr Nowina-Konopka emphasized, "Unless Poland cedes some of its sovereignty to such supranational organizations as the EU or NATO, we shall forfeit our entire national sovereignty or perhaps even become a protectorate."

Still No Timetable

Some of the speakers pointed out that Poland's integration with West Europe will take place more or less spontaneously. This would be indicated by the already observable trend toward a greater percentile increase in Polish trade with the West than with the East and by the broadening of the economic trade zone in Europe. Even now political relations with West European countries are dominated by the issue of integration. Treaty agreements are merely reinforcing the process of rapprochement with European structures.

"Still, we cannot eternally sail without reaching a harbor," said Saryusz-Wolski. "An agreement on fundamental issues has to be reached with the EU countries which often do not respond to our postulates, as if trying to delay Poland's admission to the EU. These issues are: Are we alone to adapt ourselves to them, or should they also adapt themselves to us? What about the division of labor? Are we to continue to export only steel and provide cheap manpower, or is our country also to modernize itself? If we shall merely keep on adopting EU laws, in the end the Polish public will be asking how come foreigners are to decide our laws? The EU should, in consideration of the admission of additional countries, reform its farm, regional, industrial, budget, and other policies. Yet sometimes the debate between the EU and us resembles haggling between merchants rather than between people who should bear in mind that Europe is, above all, a political construct."

The strategy for Central Europe adopted by the Essen Summit (December 1994) was compared by the government commissioner to an ice cube which was still fairly large in the planning stage but subsequently kept melting. This strategy is an important political signal concerning admission to the EU, but it has not been accompanied by defining a more specific timetable for negotiations and adoption of adaptive programs. "Sometimes I wonder," Saryusz-Wolski said, "whether the point might not be to define the criteria delaying our membership."

The commissioner estimated that Poland has two years left to define its own vision of relations with the European Union. In 1997 we are finally to be provided with a timetable for admission. In the commissioner's opinion, membership negotiations will take one to one and one-half years. Poland should convince its partners that a prerequisite for admission to the EE should be a healthy economy, not a rich one (which cannot be built rapidly), and that in our case the so-called Iberian formula should be applied. Namely, to Poland it is important to attain membership rapidly and to be granted a fairly lengthy period of time for adapting our economy to EU requirements, that is, the same solution as had been applied in the case of Spain and Portugal. "The lower our inflation rate and the better the growth of CEFTA, the closer we shall be to the EU," was the reminder offered by Andrzej Harasimowicz, the commissioner's office manager.

The Outer and Inner Circles

Andrzej Wielowieyski declared, "A federal structure of the European Union is in our national interest, because under a federation the integrative process will be more efficient. To Poland political membership in the EU on the basis of equal partnership is important. We cannot accept the status of a client who would not have the right to codecide." Saryusz-Wolski said, "We are interested in a reliable and strong Europe and not in second-class membership."

Professor Eugeniusz Piontek argued, "The concept of Europe is a pretext for the primacy of the stronger countries. That is why I am opting for an integrated Europe, because it will protect our national interests better." Zdzislaw Najder was also of this opinion.

According to Professor Jerzy Lukaszewski, the Polish ambassador to France, the most serious of the numerous new concepts of the EU is the Schauble-Lammers (CDU-CSU) proposal, because it outlines the scope of the integration of Germany and favors a federal approach. If it is to retain its importance, the EU must advance toward increasingly higher forms of integration. Yet the EU has begun to face so many perils that, instead of becoming a political construct, this organization may be reduced in form to a free trade zone. Two circles are bound to appear within the EU, according to Professor Lukaszewski, but it still is not known whether they both will be governed by the same laws, whether unity of law will be preserved. The union of the two circles is affording an opportunity for admitting Poland to the outer circle. The problem is whether we will afterward penetrate the inner circle.

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Iraqi Delegation Gets Support in Bucharest

JN2402125395 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0930 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest, 24 Feb (INA)—The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Romanian Parliament has stressed that Romanian parliamentarians are fully aware that the reasons for the blockade on Iraq have been removed, because Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations toward the UN Security Council.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said that the Romanian Parliament has contributed, through all available means, to lifting the blockade imposed on Iraq and to restoring the broad economic and trade relations between the two countries.

This came during a round of talks the Iraqi National Assembly delegation, currently in Romania, held with the Romanian parliamentarians, talks during which the two sides reviewed the relations between the two countries and means of promoting them in the service of the interests of the two peoples and countries in all spheress.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Romanian Parliament noted that the ruling party and the opposition are in agreement on foreign policy, and that it is in Romania's interest that the blockade imposed on Iraq be lifted. He said that Romania will seek to effect this through its presence in regional and international councils, committees, and parliaments.

He added: The war has harmed Romania's relations with the Arab states. These relations are historical and we fully desire to further promote them, particularly with Iraq, which is given first priority in our efforts.

Defected Spy Reportedly Back in Bucharest

AU2402085795 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 9 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Radu Tudor: "Former Romanian Spy Matei Haiducu Is in Bucharest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Former Romanian spy Matei Haiducu, a former major of the DIE [Foreign Intelligence Department],who in 1982 defected to France, is in Romania again. He became famous after he revealed to the French counterespionage services that he had been sent there by the Securitate to assassinate author Virgil Tanase, who was living in Paris and used to criticize Nicolae Ceausescu openly.

Matei Haiducu, who is now a French citizen with the name Mathieu Forestier, although he knows he is persona non grata among his former colleagues at the DIE, still came back to Romania.

The mission on which Matei Haiducu returned to our country, this time in his capacity as a DGSE [General Directorate for External Security] agent, is to contact all the decisionmakers of the Romanian secret services to negotiate exchanges of information and do some profitable business.

In autumn of 1994, Matei Haiducu visited Bucharest and held a meeting at the Intercontinental Hotel with one of Virgil Magureanu's [Romanian Intelligence Service director] deputies.

Having been unable to achieve what he wanted at that time, Matei Haiducu has now returned to Romania with new orders.

Former Official Charged With Espionage

95P20526A Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 7 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Dan Maracineanu: "The Office of the Prosecutor General Has Issued an Arrest Warrant for a Former Under Secretary of State Accused of Espionage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to parliamentary sources, on 3 February 1995, upon notification from the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI], the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Court of Justice issued a warrant for the preventive arrest of Stefan Kiraly, former under secretary of state in the Ministry of Industry, charging him with "unlawfully obtaining and possessing documents of interest to national security"—which in effect means: spying for a foreign power. Let us mention that this case was handled by the Division of Economic Counterintelligence headed by Major General Dumitru Badescu. The investigation is still ongoing. We will be back with the details.

Parliament Approves Subsidy for UDMR

LD2302140895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The nationalist forces of the Romanian parliament have failed in their attempt to exclude the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR; in Romanian, UDMR] from the list of minorities which receive a subsidy. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest.

[Bogdan] After a heated battle of words in the budget debate, the two houses of the Romanian parliament approved the subsidy allocations to the organizations of national minorities in Romania and the Romanian communities abroad. The nationalist forces in the parliament did try to exclude the HDUR from the list of those receiving government support, but this time their efforts failed.

The sum to be allocated to the bodies of national minorities in Romania, which has now been adopted, is 2.82 billion lei, approximately 165 million forints. However, out of this sum, about 300 million lei, or 18 million forints, will be used to finance actions within the framework of the European campaign against racial persecution, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and ethnic intolerance.

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Organizations of the Romanian communities abroad will receive 2.3 billion lei, 135 million forints. The legislators also decided that in 1995 the sum of 1.5 billion lei, or 88 million forints, will be spent on improving Romania's international image.

Communist Party Head Outlines Philosophy, Goals

AU2302205795 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 21 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Victor Hancu, leader of the Romanian Communist Party, by an unidentified MEDIAFAX reporter; place and date not given: "Our Adversaries Are the Parties Belonging to the Progovernmental Arch"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Victor Hancu, the president of the National Council of the Romanian Communist Party [PCR], aged 33, is an economic expert employed by the Statistics Directorate of the Gorj County Prefect's Office. He is also an assistant lecturer at the Constantin Brancusi University in the town of Targu Jiu. The political party he leads is headquartered in the basement of the building sheltering the headquarters of the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] Gorj County branch.*

[CURIERUL NATIONAL] You have asserted that you have set up PCR branches in 30 counties. How did you manage this, considering that your party is not acting legally?

[Hancu] On 7 May 1993 the Gorj branch of the Socialist Youth Union [UTS] organized a symposium in Targu Jiu, which was consecrated to the celebration of 8 May, the day on which the PCR was set up. That is when the initiative came to reestablish the PCR. Later the UTS was registered as an autonomous organization, more precisely, as a local trade union organization. Its name, the UTS, was preserved because at that time we could not yet call it PCR. Currently the PCR is allowed to function at the UTS headquarters. Later we learned from the mass media that Communist cells had been set up in various counties and we contacted them.

[CURIERUL NATIONAL] Are the philosophical principles of your party based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine?

[Hancu] Not on the Leninist, as that one has certain outdated elements, such as the one regarding the development stage reached by imperialism in various countries and the [likeliness of] revolutions in the same countries. Our theory is based on the Marxist philosophy. We have taken whatever is good in Marxism: the humanist idea, which is based on value, competence, and equality, in the sense of equal chances for each individual.

[CURIERUL NATIONAL] Does the PCR program stipulate the nationalization of the means of production?

[Hancu] Our programmatic objective is to set up a mixed, competition-type socialist economy. That is, owing to the fact that it is a mixed economy, it also provides for private ownership. However, we do not agree with the privatization of the industrial companies. In exchange for that we do not envisage the nationalization of the private companies set up after 1990.

[CURIERUL NATIONAL] Who are the principal adversaries of the PCR?

[Hancu] At first we thought that they were the right-wing parties. Meanwhile, however, we have realized that they are the parties belonging to the progovernmental arch, because it is their voters that we are taking away.

New Taxes on Small Businesses Decried

95P20439A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 7-8 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Ion Marin: "War Against Small Enterpreneurs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government seems to have launched a real offensive, using its weapon, the tax system, against small businessmen and, actually, against the middle class, which has begun to recover in Romania. This is the class whose work and shoulders support all the Western democracies. We do not know if the Romanian authorities have any fear of these people, who are more free and more liberal by their very condition, but it is certain that the recent harsh fiscal measures, to which are added the abnormal increases in rents—which go into the bottomless pocket of the state—are clearly aimed at bankrupting small businesses. [passage omitted]

Earlier, in campaign speeches, they used to talk about this stage of free initiative in messianic terms. Now, when the government has been obliged, as a result of its commitments to the International Monetary Fund, to reduce the burdensome profit tax—which has had so many harmful effects—the treasury officials looked around and lighted on the taxpayers who have the least protection: small businessmen, ordinary citizens who have found that they have to pay the financial administration 10 times as much money as last year. Real dramas have occurred because of the desperation which has justifiably gripped those people who set up a small business, indebted themselves to the bank, and sold their car and house—now that they are seeing that, in Romania, small business, which is the motivating force of the competitive economy, has been strangled from the very start.

Small businessmen in Iasi have announced that they will set fire to City Hall if the abnormal rents of 24,000 lei a month, which are added to the excessively high local taxes, are not repealed. The government's justification for this increase in local taxes and fees does not lack ingenuity. The taxes are intended for the City Halls, the municipalities, the communes, and local development. A number of aims have been achieved—the first of which is the channeling of complaints toward the local authorities, who are "infested" by the opposition. Who, then, could oppose decentralization and the strengthening of local budgets?

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In reality, however, in the absence of a law on local finances, these taxes continue to take the same roundabout route through the state budget, out of which different amounts are allocated, depending on the political pressures.

Apart from this, the completely illogical, antieconomical increase in these taxes is shocking. Their impact is destructive and it signifies a return to the market stall one square meter in size, equipped with a basket. Any stores that want to keep their doors open will have to include all these new taxes in their prices, creating more inflation and preparing for their own bankruptcy. Not even the newspaper kiosks will be able to function any longer—which really does not bother the people in power. If it is hard to believe that they would be happy about the demise of other activities, we have no doubts as regards the sales of the press and the publishing of newspapers.

However, rising above such petty satisfactions—which are actually serious attacks on the market economy—the authors of the strategy of "fiscal desperation" must rethink the system of local taxes and fees as soon as possible. Although it is a good thing that, on the whole, the tax burden has decreased because of the moderation of high taxes (in particular, the profit tax), it is not fair for the government to make up for the loss at the expense of small entrepreneurs. Indeed, this is detrimental to the process of economic reform and recovery, not to mention that it is downright immoral.

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Mladic Warns: 'Istria Will Become a War Zone'

BR2302135795 Rome L'INFORMAZIONE in Italian 23 Feb 95 p 21

[Interview with Bosnian Serb General Batko Mladic by Marzio G. Mian in Hanpiesak, Bosnia; date not given: "Mladic: 'There Will Soon Be War in Istria'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *One would expect to find bound volumes by Sun Tzu or Clausewitz on the shelves in General Batko Mladic's office, but instead there are the complete works of Hermann Hesse and Emile Zola plus, on the right-hand side of the desk, a checkers box and, on the wall behind his chair, a "gusle"—a single-stringed Serbian instrument—an antique mirror, two sacred images, and, of course, a photograph of the "president" of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia," Radovan Karadzic. Mladic, in freshly laundered camouflage fatigues, sits on a homely sofa with his elbows resting on his knees. He orders oranges (a luxury, because the embargo has turned them into forbidden fruit) and extracts from his boot a knife that looks as if it has been with him for a long time, as if he were getting out a fountain pen. He peels the orange in regular segments with his enormous hands. The ball of flesh emerges perfect and dry. He offers it to his guest. The meeting with the man who has been conducting military operations on Karadzic's behalf for three years took place at Hanpiesak, a village surrounded by snow some 70 kilometers from Sarajevo.*

[Mian] How come you read Hermann Hesse, General?

[Mladic] I do not read him any more. I read him a long time ago. It is important to have books close at hand at a certain age. Now I am at war for reasons beyond my control. Until seven years ago, I was sure that I would retire and be very bored. Just think, I am even against toy weapons. I stopped reading prose at the age of 26, and since then I have only read poetry. I have even written 100 poems or so.

[Mian] Do you all write poetry here? Have you read the poems Karadzic has written?

[Mladic] I have not read them, but I know that he has published four volumes. Time will tell whether he is a good poet. As far as the Serbs are concerned, he is definitely the man of the future. Excuse me if I get down to some work now. I work like Napoleon, who could dictate seven letters at the same time. To get back to books, I have studied the strategy textbooks on World Wars I and II, but there has been no war like this one. It may look complicated to you, but for us it is as if the Crusades happened yesterday. A friend of mine has compared me to Hannibal. If I had to choose between Hannibal and Scipio, I would definitely choose the former, because he was a genius at defending his people (a people, what is more, with very little national identity). But I will never use elephants, or tanks, to occupy land that is not Serbian.

[Mian] Nevertheless, I have heard talk of your side being ready to strike Zagreb.

[Mladic] From a distance.

[Mian] Is it true that you have met a number of high-ranking Italian officials and that you have discussed Krajina?

[Mladic] What I love about Italy is its music, and its women. I got to know a certain Rosanna in Livorno in 1979. I am sure that the trend in the Italian Army is to get out of the rut that it has been in this century. You are excellently equipped, and your territory is easy to defend. However, you have no understanding of history at all.

[Mian] Against whom will we have to defend ourselves?

[Mladic] You will not have to lift a finger, because your great and powerful ally, Croatia, will defend you...

[Mian] The Istria issue is beginning to take an ugly turn. Italy has even recalled its ambassador in Zagreb to Rome.

[Mladic] Istria is a paradise. There are a lot of Italians there. You see, for us Serbs, wherever Serbs have fallen and been buried is Serbia. I remember seeing a cemetery with 11,000 Italian graves at Tomino, which is now in Slovenia.

[Mian] Perhaps it was Redipuglia, which is in Italy...

[Mladic] I do not know. Anyway, any other European country would have behaved differently from Italy if it had had a dispute with the former Yugoslavia. It is odd that the former communists have become the most rabid nationalists in what used to be communist Europe, whereas former communists—is that what you call them?—in Italy support chauvinistic neighbors like Croatia and Slovenia.

[Mian] Your aides have told me they are certain that something will happen soon in Istria, and that you already have a penetration plan to be implemented within the framework of an intervention on Krajina's behalf.

[Mladic] When the "blue helmets" pull out of Croatia, which we hope they will because then we will solve many problems that the United Nations is incapable of solving, Istria will become a war zone. But Italy has to decide whether it wants to carry on with [former Italian Foreign Minister] De Michelis' policy, if it wants to support its worst enemy, Croatia. Your newspapers have not yet reported on the U.S. bases that are already in place on the islands of Dalmatia: A large number of aircraft carriers with their guns trained against us, and on Istria as well.

[Mian] Why on Istria?

[Mladic] Because the [Istrian] Italians are ready to rebel against Zagreb. Tudjman has ordered that the Italian minority is to be press-ganged into the Army when action commences, as it will shortly, on the Krajina

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front. The convergence of interests with Italy on Krajina is complete. There are historical ties of great friendship.

[Mian] As a general, what is your view of the war in Chechnya?

[Mladic] I have no time to follow other people's wars.

[Mian] But your Russian "brothers" are involved. In your opinion, has the Russian Army conducted an invasion or restored law and order?

[Mladic] The thing that has emerged from the war in Chechnya is that the West, NATO, and the United Nations, have learned the lesson of Yugoslavia. Having been responsible for the Yugoslav catastrophe, they are now falling over one another to justify Moscow's intervention. Allowing the secession of Slovenia and Croatia was a legalized international crime.

[Mian] What does it mean to be a Serb?

[Mladic] We are like all other human beings. We want to establish our right to live on our land. We are special from a historical point of view: We are the only people that has succeeded in forgiving the criminals who perpetrated the genocide of 1 million Serbs during World War II.

[Mian] Forgiveness attached to a timer that ran out with the death of Tito...

[Mladic] No, after Tito's death we realized that we were in danger of another genocide. We are also special in that, although we are small, we are located in a strategic position, with the result that we cannot breathe without the world becoming alarmed.

[Mian] Is it true that you are a friend of Milan [soccer team] player Savicevic?

[Mladic] No, Savicevic is a great friend of Karadzic. They call each other on the telephone. They are both from Montenegro. We shall soon be playing Italy versus Serbia.

[Mian] Greater Serbia?

[Mladic] If that were so, there would be no match.

Serb Patriarch Meets Bosnian Serb, Croat Leaders

Calls for Unity, Peace

LD2302234995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2128 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Received by Fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina, 23 Feb (SRNA)—The Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church held a session in Bijeljina today together with the top-level military and state leaderships of the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina.

SRNA presents the Public Statement, in its entirety, issued by the office of the Holy Synod following the session:

"These days, on the eve of the reverend fast and Christ's resurrection, an extraordinary session of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church in its extended composition was held in Bijeljina.

"The session was presided over by his holiness Serbian Patriarch Pavle. Apart from the members of the Holy Synod, the session was also attended by episcopal officials from the territories of the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina, several episcopal officials from Serbia, as well as the top level leaderships of the republic of Serb Krajina and the Serb republic, headed by Milan Martic and Radovan Karadzic respectively.

"The current situation of the Serbian people and matters of vital interest as regards its spiritual and physical survival were discussed at the session. It is the shared view of all the participants that a time will soon come when the Serbian people must make and materialize decisive decisions on which its future will depend.

"The extremely important role was stressed of the Serbian Orthodox Church in keeping the full unity of the Serbian people and preserving its spiritual, national, and cultural values that are the only guarantee in securing its historic goals and interests.

"All the participants in this assembly are united in the view that it is necessary to secure, as soon as possible, a lasting peace in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

"To this end it was agreed that it was of particular importance to initiate, as soon as possible, brotherly cooperation between the most responsible political and social factors among the Serbian people and lift the blockade and all other obstacles to cooperation between all parts of the Serbian people.

"Only in this way can the Serbian people face up to the historic task set by God and the time we live."

Karadzic Praises Meeting

LD2302223695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2128 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina, 23 Feb (SRNA): President of the Serb republic Radovan Karadzic said today in Bijeljina that an old practice from the history of the Serbian people continued—one should consult and ask the church, thus making use of its services in uniting the Serbian people and its policies.

In Radovan Karadzic's words, today's session of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church, attended by the leaderships of the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina, was "very beneficial."

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"We heard a great deal of wise advice and views," the president of the Serb republic said, stating that the conclusions from this session "follow the line of ancient Serbian interests."

Martic, Babic on Unity

LD2302225195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2128 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina, 23 Feb (SRNA)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina expressed in Bijeljina today his gratitude to the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church, his holiness Patriarch Pavle, and episcopal officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church for their efforts to "weave all the strands among the Serbian people."

"We expect all the leaderships of the Serbian lands to maintain the best possible relations," Martic said, noting that the Serbian Orthodox Church has been discussing disputed issues and the destiny of the Serbian people in the next period, which is going to be significant for both the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina.

Milan Babic, minister for foreign affairs of the republic of Serb Krajina, said that he expected the Serbian people to be united, to unite their defenses against the enemies, and build their own future.

"The Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina are in favor of the unification of all four Serbian states, so we expect our brothers in Serbia and Montenegro to agree on the need for unity," Babic said, noting in conclusion that in the event of their negative reply "the Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina will unite."

Krajisnik on Possible FRY Recognition of B-H

AU2302144395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Recognizing Bosnia Would Be an Unpardonable Mistake"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Obrenovac—Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Bosnian Serbs' assembly, said that the possible recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be an "unpardonable mistake."

"In that case, all that would be left to us would be to fight and offer resistance to this recognition.... We are aware of the delicate situation in which Serbia is, but recognizing Bosnia would be catastrophic," Krajisnik told Obrenovac Radio.

Krajisnik termed the establishment of official relations between Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as "dangerous" and said that this act will "encourage the Muslims to continue the war."

"This news on recognition was received among the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina with great disappointment," Krajisnik added.

According to him, Moscow decided in favor of the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina due to "internal needs," that is, due to events in Chechnya and problems in relations with Islamic world.

Krajisnik confirmed that Aleksa Buha, minister of foreign affairs of the Serbian Republic, arrived in Belgrade. He said that the visit is "of a private nature" and that it was only at the third attempt that Buha was granted permit to enter Yugoslavia in order to visit his ill wife."

"It would be useful for all of us if that visit is used for political purpose," he added.

Bosnian Croats Will Not Give Up Own State

LD2402064595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0016 GMT 24 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 23 (TANJUG)—Senior official in the parliament of the Bosnian Croat state of Herzeg-Bosna Ivan Bender said Thursday that Bosnian Croats would not give up their own state.

Bender said Bosnian Croat political leaders had promised fellow Croats that they would "create a Croat state in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and we shall not give up on that."

Herzeg-Bosna is a guarantee that Croats will survive in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bender said, opening a Croat police station in the town of Vitez in central Bosnia, the official radio station of the Bosnian Croat state said.

Bosnian Croats and Muslims formed a federation in March 1994, but the state formed under patronage of the United States practically does not exist because the two sides are not giving up their respective state organs.

Bosnian Croats continue to constitute their newly formed Croat municipality of Soli in the area of Tuzla in northeastern Bosnia, in spite of protests from the local Muslim authorities, the Herzeg-Bosna radio said on Thursday.

The new Croat municipality covers parts of the municipalities of Tuzla, Zivinica, Lukavac and Banovici, which have majority Croat populations.

The local Muslim authorities claim the forming of this Croat municipality is illegal and in violation of the federal agreement.

Silajdzic Blames Croats for Agreement Failure

AU2302160295 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 95 p 16

[Article by I. Milesic: "Herzeg-Bosnian Authorities Represent the Main Blockage"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Zenica—Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and government ministers took part in a public forum held in Zenica. The topic of the forum was economic revival and the way to activate production, and most of the questions asked by the participants dealt with the implementation of the Washington agreements, activating the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and relations between Croats and Bosniaks.

According to Prime Minister Silajdzic, the Croatian side is the sole culprit responsible for the current situation regarding failure to implement the Washington agreements. They are also blocking a quicker realization of the agreement. According to Silajdzic, the main role in this blockage is played by the leadership of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, who are misinterpreting almost all points of that document. Prime Minister Silajdzic pointed out again that authorities under the control of Bosniak Muslims permit movement to Croats, unlike the way in which the Herzeg-Bosnian authorities behave. As usual, examples given were Stolac, Capljina, Livno, Kiseljak, and Busovaca, while he failed to give examples proving the opposite.

On this occasion, Silajdzic pointed out that it is most important that the Croats and Bosniak Muslims have not been fighting for almost a year, which provides assurance that numerous disagreements will be solved.

Silajdzic, Ministers Meet Local Officials

AU2302210595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Report by Enes Osamancevic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the government delegation led by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic held a meeting with representatives of the cantons, okrugs, and heads of communes of all our country's free territories in Tuzla today. The meeting was also attended by Generals Fikret Muslimovic and Enver Hadzihasanovic, members of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Enes Osmancevic has the details:

[Osmancevic] Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and his aides today held very useful talks with representatives of the cantons, okrugs, and communes from all the free parts of our country. The main topic of the talks was the government's work this year. Those attending were briefed by several ministers on the planned activities of their ministries. Faruk Smailbegovic, minister for economics and energy, stressed four main tasks of the government: strengthening the defense capability of the country, improving the population's living conditions, reviving the economy, and establishing the country's legal and economic systems.

Deputy Defense Minister Muhamed Lemet spoke about setting up unified logistics and the obligations of the cantons, okrugs, and communes in the free territories. Deputy Justice Minister Izet Muhamedagic spoke about work to develop the justice system. Enes Karic, minister of science, education, culture, and sports, spoke about plans for education in the free territories of our country.

The government's program from 1995 was met with the approval of those present. They used this opportunity to ask for additional explanations and propose to the prime minister and minister some solutions.

Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic warned that the concept of unified logistics will be impossible to realize unless the issue of customs and unobstructed travel in the free territories is solved. Lukavac Mayor Sead Hasanhodzic called for [words indistinct] demanding rapid intervention from the government, especially in companies that could start production with minimal investment.

A report on the grave situation in Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde drew particular attention. Detailed reports on the situations in Mostar, Vares, Breza, and Busovaca were also presented at this meeting. They also pointed out problems that needed urgent solutions.

Having listened to those taking part in the discussion, Prime Minister Silajdzic spoke about some burning issues of our real situation. First of all, he warned that there should be no conflict in the jurisdiction of the cantons, okrugs, and communes. We must mobilize all forces to help ourselves. Our prime objectives are well known and we must do everything to stop our dependence on humanitarian aid. In the process of reviving production, we must fight to find a place for everyone. In this sense, the prime objective is to halt the brain drain, because without experts we cannot achieve what we want to achieve, Prime Minister Silajdzic said.

Unfortunately, I have not heard a single word of self-criticism here. I am speaking about the problem of usurping radio stations (?and) the frequencies of Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This problem must urgently be solved, Dr. Silajdzic stressed, appealing to the commune heads and the representatives of the cantons and okrugs to do everything they could to free the frequencies of the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As we have reported, Prime Minister Silajdzic and his aides are meeting the representatives of the mines and the [word indistinct] thermoelectric plant.

Banja Luka Delegation Says 240,000 Expelled

AU2302194695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, received a delegation from the Banja Luka region, led by Mirza Mujagic, head of this region.

The delegation told Dr. Ganic that some 240,000 people from this region are in exile. Of these, only a fifth have

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stayed in Bosnia, while the others are scattered all over the world. The refugees at home and abroad face all kinds of problems, but their only wish is to return to the homes from which they were expelled with force.

The good response by the people from the [Bosnian] Krajina to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the worthy military results achieved by their units only confirm their commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina and their readiness to liberate it and return to their homes.

Dr. Ganic confirmed his support for efforts to improve the functioning of the civil and military authorities in that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is under the temporary occupation of the Serbian aggressor, and in this way facilitate the best possible reception of the refugees and displaced persons.

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Commentator on Potentials of Serb, Croat Navies

AU2402090995 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 95 p 8

[Article by Mladen Jurasek: "Yugo Fleet Will Not Go Anywhere From Bar and Ulcinj"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the middle of February, the "Yugoslav Navy" held major sea maneuvers in order to demonstrate its readiness for war. With the participation of as many as 18 vessels they wanted to deny the appraisals by foreign military experts about the low level of preparedness by the Serbian-Montenegrin navy. All this was aimed at frightening Croatia with a large sea power. We will briefly describe this large sea "power" and compare it with the Croatian Navy.

The most dangerous "Yugoslav" warships are five large patrol and another five smaller submarines. The largest submarines are the three 1,350-tonne submarines of the Heroj class. They were built in the late 1960's and all three are more than 25 years old. Their operational ability is therefore questionable. Two submarines of the Sava class are of 960 tonnes. These are 10 years younger than the Heroj class. Regarding their general characteristics, they are adapted to operate in the Adriatic Sea, and are equipped with Russian produced 533-mm guided torpedoes. It is thought that one submarine from each class can be operational at any time. In a possible war, these submarines could pose a danger only to slow merchant ships, or lay mines in front of harbors. Although the former Yugoslav Navy had planned to fit them with anti-ship missiles, this has probably not been done. Therefore, they cannot attack fast warships with good maneuvering capabilities. What is worrying for them is the presence of at least one Los Angeles class nuclear submarine in the Adriatic. These U.S. submarines are meant for hunting other submarines. Considering that their main task in the Adriatic is to protect U.S. vessels, above all the aircraft carrier, there is always a possibility of them attacking a "Yugo-submarine." The outdated Serbian submarines would not stand a chance of surviving.

The five small submarines of the Una class are meant for transporting subversive groups or for laying mines. Although they are not fitted with torpedoes, they could turn out to be more dangerous than the big ones. They are quieter and more modern in every respect.

Of the bigger warships, the most potent are the two of the Split class (Russian class Koni), and the ships of the Kotor class, built in Kraljevica. These frigates are relatively well equipped. Although they had originally not been fitted with anti-ship missiles, the former Yugoslav Navy subsequently fitted on them SS-N- 20 Styx missiles. The ships also have the SA-N-4 medium-range antiaircraft systems. Only these ships in the Serbian navy have these systems fitted on them.

The five missile gunboats of the Rade Koncar class and the five Osa missile boats are also fitted with anti-ship missiles. All these vessels, like the aforementioned frigates, are equipped with the SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles. The Osa missile boats have four old types of SS-N-2A, while others have more modern SS-N-2C missiles (the frigates have four and missile gunboats two of them). The Styx missiles have a range of 83 km and a large warhead weighing 513 kilograms. This is more than enough to sink the majority of modern warships, under the condition that it hits them. Missiles produced in the 1950's, despite their modernization, are no longer considered effective weapons. However, they are still suitable for terrorist actions against passenger ships.

On the other hand, the Croatian Navy has only two ships equipped for missile anti-ship combat. What represents a problem for the Serbs, and is our advantage, is that fact that both ships are equipped with the most modern anti-ship missiles, the RBS 15. The Kralj Petar Kresimir IV and the Sibenik missile gunboats have proven their usefulness at the Poseidon 1994 exercises. The Kresimir can carry up to eight and Sibenik up to four RBS 15 missiles. In this way they can fire a salvo of 12 missiles, which is sufficient to sink more than half of the Serbian navy in one attack alone. In addition, the Serbs cannot be sure how well equipped the Croatian coastal services and the coastal artillery are. The narrow entrance to the Boka Kotorska Bay and the proximity of the Croatian border makes the situation considerably more complicated for the Serbs. One should not be surprised if the Croatian experts have not managed to mount the RBS 15 missiles also on trucks, which is normal in other parts of the world. Thanks to its modern radar guidance and a range of 70 km, the RBS 15 is very effective even when it is launched from trucks parked on the shore. In this way all bigger Adriatic islands could become unsinkable war ships.

All in all, one can freely say that the Serbian navy is demonstrating "force," but that in a possible conflict it would stay in the ports. Not in Boka Kotorska, but in Bar and Ulcinj, far away from the mighty Croatian artillery.

Deputy PM Skego Reviews Economic Trends

AU2302131895 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 18 Feb 95 p 3

[Report by Vesna Antonic: "There Will Be No Inflation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—"It is possible to see by Croatia's example that growth can only be achieved in stable conditions. Stories to the effect that a little more inflation would help bigger production are legitimate, but we believe the contrary is true and we shall not give an inch. Experience from 1992, 1993, and 1994 shows that increase in production, real wages, and pensions is only possible in stable conditions, and vice versa. If we wish to decrease wages and pensions, we can generate a monthly inflation of 30 percent. Certain people might be glad to get a 20-percent monthly rise, but it will be nominal. This is what we call a 'financial illusion' on

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which you can coast along for some time, but ultimately you pay a much higher price."

This is what Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Borislav Skegro said at the news conference on 17 February, and added that the government was decisive in battling all problems.

"A real 0.8-percent increase of the gross domestic product in comparison to 1993 was achieved for the first time last year. It is not spectacular, but it is present," the deputy prime minister stressed and illustrated the claim with numerous figures.

He added that according to his estimates, the real gross domestic product is 84 billion kunas, or $15 billion, or 23 billion German marks [DM]. "This year, with the estimated 7-percent real growth and very low inflation, we expect the nominal gross domestic product to increase by 10 percent, which means that it would be some 92 billion kunas—that is, $16.5 billion or DM23.3 billion—providing, of course, that the exchange rate remains at the present level," Skegro said.

Without Drastic Changes

Skegro then said: "The fact that during the past year we had a real increase of the gross domestic product, which at the end of the year exceeded the 1993 figure by 5 percent, allows for more optimism. I do not see any single reason in the economy which would imply an either upward or downward swing in the trend."

"Even if the military-political situation were to deteriorate slightly, I still see no reason for drastic changes," the deputy prime minister stressed.

Addressing the situation in industrial production, the deputy prime minister said that the January 1995 figure shows that it has increased by 6.1 percent in comparison to January 1994. He also said that he was sure that this would be the case throughout the year.

"The latest data on exports show that the January export was worth $370 million (excluding the former Yugoslav states it was $303 million), while last year it was only $135 million. Imports in January 1995 came to $505 million (excluding the former Yugoslav states it was $448 million). In January, therefore, we had a $135-million trade deficit, which has significantly surpassed our expectations," the deputy prime minister continued.

Services Have Covered the Negative Balance

Speaking about the structure of Croatia's balance of payments based on data for 11 months of the previous year, Skegro said that exports came to $3.8 billion, while imports came to $4.6 billion, so that the negative trade gap for the 11 months was $730 million. However, the inflow from services was $2.1 billion and the outflow was $1.4 billion, so that the positive balance for services was $708 million, which means that services canceled out the negative balance in commodity exchange.

In the course of the 11 months, Croatia collected $87 million in interest rates and paid out $186 million. Unilateral transfers brought in $546 million in revenue, while expenditure amounted to $127 million, so that the balance was around $419 million.

"When you sum up goods, services, interest, and transfers in current transactions, you have a revenue of $6.6 billion and expenditure of $6.3 billion with a positive balance up to $300 million," Skegro added and reiterated that in this period, Croatia had been using loans more than it had been paying them off.

"The adopted budget is tight and ambitious in terms of the expected tax revenue. We assess that the situation is tense, but we are in control of it," Skegro said and stressed that this was not the only reason for the sharp action over tax evasion. He stressed that several substantial tax evasion scams—measured in millions of kunas—have been discovered, and "no one is going to get off scot free, not even the big fish." (editor's note: big fish is printed in italics).

Asked whether the overall tax burden was great, Skegro said that it was bigger than in West European countries, but it was not the biggest, since there are countries that distribute up to 60 percent of their gross domestic product.

Addressing the issue of income taxes, Skegro stressed that this is where the first cuts are to be implemented. Asked whether there were any indications of how the income tax reporting was going, Skegro said that there were no real indicators, but that "crowds" were expected next week, while "the last day would be a madhouse."

Serb Party Leader Says Rights of Serbs Violated

LD2302201795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1924 GMT 23 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb. 23 (TANJUG)—Leader of the Serb People's Party in Croatia Milan Djukic said Wednesday that his party was concerned about Croatia's stand toward the peace process and the protection of human rights and freedoms of the Serb people.

Djukic said that it was difficult to accept the Croatian Government was for a peaceful option when it had said that the resolution of the conflict could be sought only within the Croatian Constitution.

He said that such position toward a possible political solution to the conflict, lack of political will and readiness to mutual concessions, were leading directly to war.

Djukic welcomed the Serb Krajina government's readiness to negotiate political issues, with a mediation from United Nations Protection Force, which had been in the service of peace so far.

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He said that the rights of Serbs in Croatia had not been protected, but their responsibilities had been increased. He said that large numbers of Serbs were being forcibly mobilized into Croatian Army. Serbs continue to flee Croatia daily, said Djukic.

Djukic quoted an M.P. of the Croatian parliament Sime Djodan as saying recently that because the total number of Serbs in Croatia had dropped to under 5 percent, Serbs 'had no right to an autonomy.'

'Had this not been part of an official policy,' wondered Djukic and quoted Djodan's report that 350,000 Serbs had fled Croatia.

Serbs in Croatia left under the various forms of pressure such as forcible conversion to Catholicism, discharges from work, eviction, house demolition and even murder.

The Croatian Government on Jan. 12 decided to deny further hospitality to U.N. peacekeepers after their term expired on March 31, thus repeating its war threat against the republic of Serb Krajina.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Martic To Launch 'Surface-to-Zagreb' Missiles

AU2402164695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Feb 95

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is what Milan Martic told Radio Knin: We have new missiles of the surface-to-Zagreb type, and they will be launched if the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] withdraws from Croatia. Martic said that the missiles were already directed not only at Zagreb, but also at Karlovac, Zadar, and Osijek.

So the tension in Croatia has been increasing following the announced departure of UNPROFOR. The threats from Knin sound increasingly belligerent. However, we have learned from UNPROFOR sources in Zagreb that UNPROFOR will stay, but no longer as a buffer zone between the Croats and Serbs. Instead apparently some 5,000 to 6,000 peacekeepers would be deployed along the international borders of Croatia. The United Nations is allegedly already doing everything it can to persuade the Krajina Serbs to accept this.

However, to judge by the statements coming from Knin, there is no chance for this. They, Martic and company, want UNPROFOR to stay under the same, unchanged, mandate. The Serb radio stations on the occupied parts of Croatia have been reporting that UNPROFOR must stay—as they say—along the present state borders between Croatia and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Martic told this to Akashi two days ago.

The problem seems insoluble and dangerous, foreign diplomats in Zagreb say. President Tudjman has not said anything about the possible change in the UNPROFOR mandate, and foreign observers think that Tudjman should consider letting UNPROFOR stay, particularly since—as we have said—Milan Martic has repeated three times in two days that he has already set up surface-to-Zagreb missiles.

Martic: UN 'Ignoring' Expulsion of Serbs

LD2302134095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1154 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 23 Feb (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], has sent a letter to the UN Security Council president in which he proposes the setting up of a neutral group of historians and lawyers to compile an objective and detailed analysis of the causes and consequences of the Krajina-Croatia conflict.

This analysis, as well as also other facts uncovered by the team of experts, would be of great and significant importance when decisions are adopted by the Security Council, Martic believes.

To back up this request, Martic cites as an argument the fact that for six years now the Security Council "has been ignoring the fact of the expulsion of Serbs from the Republic of Croatia."

Even in statements by its president, Martic stresses, the Security Council has failed to condemn Croatia for ethnic cleansing and mass murder.

Thus, the letter says, the Security Council "has overstepped all the norms of international law and the spirit of the UN Charter, and this has allowed Croatia to continue its state terror against the remaining Serbs and prepare a fresh aggression against the RSK."

The letter stresses that "ignoring the factual situation in relations between Croatia and the RSK leads to erroneous policy decisions by the United Nations which is rewarding the guilty and punishing the victims."

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Albanian Leaders Meet Gligorov, Discuss Arrests

AU2302154195 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 23 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by "I.A.": "Situation Relatively Calm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetova, 22 Feb—The present political and security situation in Tetova after the tragic events of 17 February in front of the premises of the University of Tetova in Recica e Vogel [Mala Recica] remains tense, mainly because of new arrests by the police that show that the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government does not wish to pacify the situation or to use dialogue to settle outstanding problems. After the arrest of Nevzat Halili, Law Faculty lecturer Musli Halimi has also been detained by the police.

Albanian political organizations are making tremendous efforts to overcome the serious situation that was created by the police intervention and to create conditions for the University of Tetova to start its work. As part of these efforts, Albanian political organizations represented by Abdurrahman Haliti, chairman of the Party of Democratic Prosperity; Iliaz Halimi, chairman of the People's Democratic Party; and Mycereme Rusi, chairwoman of the Women's League, met Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia, in Skopje yesterday evening. They asked Gligorov to commit himself directly to the release of the Albanian prisoners and said that there was no legal basis for their prosecution. However, there were no tangible results from these talks.

The Communal Assembly held an extraordinary meeting in Tetova today; the only items on the agenda were an assessment of the political situation following the events of 17 February and the release of the Albanian party leaders and intellectuals. Communal Chairman Shaqir Haliti, in his statement, spoke about the efforts of the Communal Assembly Presidium to overcome the situation and the talks he had with foreign delegations. He blamed the Macedonian Government for the tragic events at Recica e Vogel, because it had dragged its heels in approving the laws on higher education and on local self-government. He added that this assembly is now working without any law. Albanian councillors strongly criticized Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski and Internal Affairs Minister Ljubomir Frkovski, and some even demanded their resignations. Myzafer Kamberi, in his speech, called the police pro-Serbian. The Macedonian councillors reacted strongly against the speeches taking such a direction, and walked out of the meeting in protest.

Xhaferri Condemns 'Police State' Actions

AU2302213895 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Telephone interview with Arber Xhaferri, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, by announcer Asllan Bajrami on 23 February—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Honored viewers, the Albanian political parties and institutions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] convened again last night to consider the situation created after the intervention of the Macedonian police forces against the Tetovo University and following the latest arrests of Albanian political activists and intellectuals. We have now on the telephone Mr. Arber Xhaferri, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity. Mr. Xhaferri, what are the conclusions approved at this meeting?

[Xhaferri] Joint conclusions were approved at the meeting and it was unanimously assessed that the police intervention, the violent interruption of the teaching process, the killing of Ebdu Selam Emini, the wounding of a large number of passers-by, the arrests of Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, Arben Rusi, Milaim Fejziu, Nevzat Halili, Professor Muste Halimi, and others are imprudent acts that increase political and ethnic tensions and have a tendency of being further aggravated.

Representatives from all parties and institutions attended the meeting. I can mention the names of Iljaz Halimi, Qiran Mazllami, Xhemal Idrizi, Sulejman Hyseni, Myqereme Rosi from the Albanian Women's League in Macedonia, etc. The Albanian political parties and institutions viewed these actions with concern, as a sign of a political system being transformed into a police one, which not only spreads fear among the Albanian population, but also manifests a crisis in all segments of society.

Under the mask of a judicial state, a police state is thrown on the stage, a state which intervenes with so much brutality and further amplifies problems, opposition, and the lack of solutions to conflicts.

[Bajrami] What concrete steps will the Albanian political parties and institutions in Macedonia undertake in the future?

[Xhaferri] Being conscious of the responsibility for the subsequent course of events, the Albanian political parties and institutions, i.e. the Albanian Women's League of Macedonia, invited the citizens to express their dissatisfaction in a civilized way against the violence and continuous repression that has already become a generator of the crisis.

In a sign of pain for the innocent killing of Abdu Selam Emini, tomorrow will be announced as a mourning day. All our individual, family, and institutional actions should be adapted to the mourning day. The place where the lamented was killed will be called the Square of the Martyr of Education. On the same day, tomorrow, according to his family request, a prayer will be held for the dead in a mosque in Recice e Vogel village .

As of 1100 on Saturday [25 February], homages will be paid at the Square of the Martyr. At 2100-2200 on Sunday, the Writers Association will organize a literary

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party of protest, which will be transmitted to all Macedonian cities populated by Albanians.

On Monday, a petition of dissatisfaction will be circulated, and so on. This is the first cycle of protests that will be held despite further developments.

[Bajrami] Mr. Xhaferri, can you finally tell us when classes at Tetovo University are expected to start?

[Xhaferri] Classes at Tetovo University will begin soon, and only the rectorate and the senate of the university and no one else have the prerogatives to decide this. I think that granting prerogatives to formal and nonformal subjects are harmful and we insist that only those who enjoy this responsibility and prerogative should be consulted here.

[Bajrami] Mr. Xhaferri, thank you for the conversation.

The People's Democratic Party has also sent information about the meeting of the Albanian political parties and institutions held last night in Tetovo, which mentions conclusions that you just heard by Party for Democratic Prosperity Chairman Arber Xhaferri via telephone.

Students Protest Against University in Tetovo

LD2302202995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1746 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 23 Feb (TANJUG)—Over 2,000 students of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius university today staged a protest in front of the parliament in Skopje against parallel university education in the Albanian language.

At this peaceful protest—which was attended by students and other citizens of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] but not by university professors—Toni Mircevski, the president of the student organization, read out a declaration on the latest developments regarding the ethnic [Albanian] university in Tetovo.

Besides calling for a single and integrated higher education in "the official Macedonian language," the declaration stresses and demands that students be admitted to university in line with the principle of equality and without any reference to quotas.

We demand from the executive authorities to uncompromisingly protect the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia, Mircevski stressed. The declaration underlines the need to resolve all problems regarding minority education but strictly in line with international conventions.

By saying today that extremism could never be fought with other forms of extremism, Djuner Ismail, the Skopje government spokesman had obviously expressed the FYROM government's negative stance toward today's peaceful protest.

Ethnic Albanian students enrolling at the Skopje university this afternoon issued their own declaration in which they had distanced themselves from the peaceful protest. They also warned of dangers contained in the method "street democracy."

Following today's gathering in Skopje and yesterday's events in the Tetovo municipal assembly, it is clear that the Macedonian-Albanian division regarding the unconstitutional ethnic university has acquired a new, impalpable dimension.

Last night, head of Macedonia's diplomacy Stevo Crvenkovski received the Albanian Ambassador in Skopje Saban Murati, it was stated here.

In this context Crvenkovski stressed that some qualifications in the statements about the latest events regarding the so-called university in Tetovo made by representatives of Albania's authorities are unacceptable, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Skopje says in its statement.

The Albanian ambassador was told about serious concern over demonstrations held outside the FYROM Embassy in Tirana on 20 February, during the course of which unacceptable and extremely offending qualifications were voiced about the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia and its state institutions and official personalities.

According to Crvenkovski, this damages the hitherto positive development of Macedonian-Albanian relations.

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Draft Agreement on NATO Cooperation Presented

AU2302165495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 23 Feb 95

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Brussels]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovenia's Foreign Minister Thaler today handed a draft of Slovenia's individual program in the Partnership for Peace to NATO Secretary General Claes. This is a concrete program of NATO's cooperation with the Slovene Army that specifies the spheres of cooperation and obligations of both sides. Numerous signatories of the Partnership for Peace Plan have already signed individual programs and are already implementing them.

Thaler merely handed a draft program to Claes, which means that Slovenia and NATO are still negotiating how and in what spheres they should cooperate. An individual program in the Partnership for Peace is the responsibility of the Defense Ministry, however, it is no secret that the pace of preparations in practice primarily depends on NATO.

According to Thaler, the Slovene interest is not merely in the Partnership for Peace. In the long term, he sees our full-fledged membership in NATO. Thaler is, of course, well aware that NATO even in cases of strategically much more important countries than Slovenia avoids giving concrete promises about full-fledged membership; however, he made it known just in case. Thaler's proposal for cooperation—that is, assistance in the possible UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] withdrawal from Croatia—was understood as a Slovene proposal to NATO that might help raise our strategic price. It is no secret that NATO is preparing a plan of UNPROFOR's evacuation from the former Yugoslavia if war should flare up there again. [passage omitted]

Slovene-Croatian Border Commission Meets

AU2402111095 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's meeting of the mixed commission for the border between Slovenia and Croatia was successful. One of the results of the meeting is an agreement to separate the border issue from other issues burdening Slovene-Croatian relations, as this problem has considerable implications for the states' sovereignty.

The presidents of both delegations agreed that the talks on border will be lengthy. They both supported an idea about an agreement on border zone traffic and cooperation. This agreement would regulate life for the people living along the border.

FRY Officer Sentenced for Spying for Slovenia

95BA0139A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 21 Jan 95 p 24

[Article by Slobodan Dukic: "Officer Who Spied for Slovenia Sentenced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At a military court in Belgrade, the defendant, Drazic, did not deny that he had contacts with Slovene intelligence officers.*

From our correspondent.

Belgrade, 20 Jan—The senate of the Belgrade military court today sentenced Lazar Drazic, a lieutenant colonel in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] Army and commander of the Uzice garrison, to two years in prison for spying for the Slovene intelligence service.

An article published in today's POLITIKA says, among other things, that in July 1992 Lieutenant Colonel Drazic joined the Slovene intelligence service, and then collected and sent it information classified as state secrets. Before the withdrawal of Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] units from Slovenia, on 24 October 1991 Lieutenant Colonel Drazic, in a certain bar near the Ljubljana livestock market, met with Matjaz Miklavz and Miran Barbaric, employees of the Slovene Security Service, and promised that he would gather the requested information for them. At the beginning of May 1992, Drazic also concluded an agreement with intelligence officer Brane Praznik.

In accordance with those secret agreements, the defendant Drazic traveled twice to Slovenia, and provided intelligence officers there with information on the political situation in Serbia, information on the number of troops and composition of the Yugoslav Army, the number of armies, the Air Force and Air Defense, the Navy, and the attitudes of Yugoslav officers toward officers of non-Serbian nationalities. At the trial, the defendant Drazic denied that he was a member of the Slovene intelligence service, but did not deny his contacts with the above-mentioned intelligence officers, only claiming that he did not know what kind of work those people were engaged in. The court did not take his defense into consideration.

The court was of the opinion that Drazic did not officially join the Slovene intelligence service, but that it was a textbook example of persuading people to work on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. The Serbian military laws on espionage specify stricter penalties, but in Drazic's case they took into account the alleviating circumstance that the information that he sent to the Slovenes could also have been gathered by other means, because many officers joined the Slovene Army after the collapse of the JNA.

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Federal

Envoy to UN Djokic on Talks With Stoltenberg

LD2402010695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2358 GMT 23 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Feb. 23 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Ambassador to the United Nations Dragomir Djokic on Thursday warned U.N. Mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg that Croatia's denial of further hospitality to U.N. troops was a dangerous move that might trigger another war.

Commenting on the 'contact group' latest diplomatic initiatives regarding the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Djokic said after the meeting with Stoltenberg that the contact group should take a more realistic approach to the problem than it had taken so far.

The lifting of the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia is a precondition for any talks, Djokic said and warned that instead of watching their own interests in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, international mediators should equally treat the interests of all warring sides.

Under the latest proposal by the contact group members (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia), Yugoslavia's recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav Republics is the condition for the suspension of the U.N. sanctions.

Army Introduces Cost-Cutting Measures

AU2302131495 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 95 pp 6-7

[Article by Sladjana Ristic: "How To Increase the Budget Pie"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As is known, the Federal Assembly has approved the 1995 federal budget and within it, the funds amounting to 1.611 billion dinars for the financing of the VJ [Army of Yugoslavia] and other defense matters that fall in the sphere of competence of the SMO [Federal Defense Ministry]. This represents 7.6 percent of the estimated gross domestic product or 76 percent of the total federal budget. Despite the fact that these funds are greater by 334 million dinars than the funds last year, they nevertheless fall short of the estimated needs of the Army and defense matters by as much as 854 million dinars—almost one-third of the approved funds. The VJ has been in an unfavorable situation concerning finances, and thus survival, for several years in succession. [passage omitted]

Commenting on the prospects this year, Lieutenant General Ratomir Milanovic told our paper that, despite all the financial restrictions and limitations, the reserves of weapons and other military equipment have been maintained at a certain level and the degree of combat readiness has not suffered. General Milanovic stressed that the Army this year will have to stick to a rigorous savings program, mentioning several areas where this could be done.

In the quartermaster corps, a program involving changes in the menu is just about to be completed. This program envisages a reduction by 100 calories in the average daily meal. This will not endanger the soldiers' health, but will facilitate a more rational use of food and considerable savings. [passage omitted]

The consumption of water in the VJ is a big problem. First of all, there is not enough water, especially in Montenegro. The situation in Serbia is not much better either. Second, water is not being used very rationally. The third problem is that we are paying for water as if we were a business organization (2.4 dinars per cubic meter). We are not a business organization and cannot incorporate this cost in the price of our product. For this reason, we have sent a request to the state organs to allow us to pay for water like schools do (1.2 dinars) as, after all, we in the Army barracks teach soldiers. In the future, the use of water will be very restrictive so that we do not end up paying 33 million dinars like last year and 10 times less for scientific-research work. The situation concerning use of electricity is similar. Regarding heating, whose costs are also very high, last year we invested 1.9 million dinars for a program that would make the gas heating in military schools and the VMA [Military Medical Academy] cheaper. [passage omitted].

Colonel Zivorad Vujcic spoke to us about measures and activities in the Army that will alleviate the material and financial difficulties of the VJ in 1995. According to him, the General Staff of the VJ has adopted the above-mentioned measures in eight general and thoroughly worked out points. A deadline for their implementation has been set, and this is the end of the first quarter—that is, the end of April. Some of the tasks that were set will be of the permanent character and their realization will be monitored all the time.

"So, in this period we will reexamine the size, structure, and organization of the Federal Defense Ministry and the VJ with the view of reducing their size in both peace and war times. We will become more involved in generating income and collecting debts, we will reduce all forms of expenditure as much as possible, rationalize and reduce supplies, speed up the transformation of the military income-generating institutions, speed up decisions on the sale and leasing of military facilities and some residential buildings, examine the possibilities of engaging special units to look after training centers in order to cut the cost of transportation of the units with the necessary NVO [armaments and military equipment], and consider the possibility of renting or leasing Army residency buildings to the Federal Government. All those involved in carrying out these tasks will make their own plans and the General Staff will control their realization at its regular and extraordinary sessions," Colonel Vujcic said.

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Former President Cosic Supports Bosnian Serbs

95BA0139C Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 28 Jan 95 p 11

[Article by (tm): "Cosic Supports the Bosnian Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 28 Jan—After a long period, Serbian writer and former president of the Serbian-Montenegrin Yugoslavia Dobrica Cosic has spoken out again. He told the independent television network Studio B that he did so in order to inform the public that he supported the just struggle of the Serbian people in Bosnia and in Croatia, where they want a single state with Serbia. In the future, he will work with the humanitarian organization Bratja Bratom [Brothers for Brothers], which was established by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

It is interesting that Dobric Cosic spoke out only two days after the announced release from prison of Vojislav Seselj, a radical proponent of Greater-Serbian ideas. Both of the two more important democratic parties in Serbia also support a Greater Serbia in their own ways, and some of the smaller parliamentary and nonparliamentary parties also agree with them. That is why the first public appearance by the former Yugoslav president, one of the drafters of the memorandum on a Greater Serbia and Milosevic's opponent, has considerable significance, especially because of the full support of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Now the main thing is what the Army will decide, because according to some estimates at least a third of the officers in it support such a policy.

Serbia

Weekly Claims Milosevic Accepts Russian Plan

AU2302165695 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 95 p 2

[Unattributed "exclusive" report: "Milosevic Has Agreed To Recognize Croatia and Bosnia in Exchange for a Complete Lifting of the Sanctions, the Right to FRY's Succession, and a Lasting Cease-Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The longest tete-a-tete meeting in the history of the resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev did not end without any success, as the international press rushed to report. TELEGRAF has learned from diplomatic circles, which insist on anonymity, that very successful tete-a-tete talks were held in the seclusion of Karadjordjevo and that these resulted in the rejection of the U.S. proposal of "recognition in return for suspension of sanctions." However, during these talks, Milosevic's proposal of conditions and ways to overcome the current stalemate matured. Kozyrev accepted the majority of proposals put forward by the Serbian president and started a feverish series of activities that should produce the most serious attempt so far to halt the war and normalize relations.

The official mission of Andrey Kozyrev consisted of convincing the Serbian president to accept the latest Washington plan: The recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina within the AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders in return for a two-month complete suspension of sanctions and U.S. guarantees for a complete lifting of the blockade of the FRY if no drastic negative shifts occur in the meantime.

On the first day of the talks on Friday [17 February], Milosevic politely listened to a proposal that he knew well just so as to reject it entirely. At his insistence that in exchange for recognition the sanctions should be lifted completely, he was told that the United States had made it plain to the Russians that anything of this kind was out of the question under any circumstances. The Clinton administration is afraid of a possible scenario in which, after a possible lifting of the sanctions, the Yugoslav Army and various volunteers would rush into Krajina and Bosnia and continue the war, and it would be impossible to reintroduce sanctions as Moscow would veto it.

Although it appeared that the Russian minister might have left without accomplishing his task on Saturday [18 February], the shift occurred when Kozyrev informed his host that he had the unofficial agreement of England and France to attempt to find a solution that would be acceptable to the Americans. London, Paris, and Moscow have long been angry with Washington for its unyielding stance and frequent change of policy, and, thus, the Russian minister tried to find a way out of the crisis together with Milosevic.

To the great surprise of the diplomats, the first proposal by Slobodan Milosevic was that Croatia and the FRY recognize each other, with the international community simultaneously recognizing FRY as the sole legal successor of the deceased SFRY. It seems that Kozyrev himself was skeptical about the possibility of giving such guarantees; however, the plan nevertheless fell through following the U.S. explicit demand that the recognition be carried out in a package, including Croatia and Bosnia. However, Washington was more interested in the form than in the essence and stated that it would not step down from this minimal demand.

The Russian minister was not willing to leave Karadjordjevo without any diplomatic success that could be attributed to Russia, because the instructions of President Yeltsin were clear: To demonstrate that the government is still powerful and capable of achieving an agreement in the international sphere where the Americans have failed. Russian negotiator Zotov, as an expert on details and a diplomat familiar with the smallest intricacies in the Contact Group's work so far, arrived on Saturday. In the meantime, he contacted first the French and then the

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English side to obtain consensus for a framework plan that was in the meantime being formulated by Kozyrev.

The essential novelty, introduced by the Russian-English-French plan, is an attempt to link up as many problems as possible and approach an overall resolution of the situation at a peace conference, as recently proposed by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. The plan envisages:

1. To hold a summit under the auspices of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia [ICFY] before the expiry of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate in Croatia, that is, by the end of March. Presidents of all the republics (including Izetbegovic from Bosnia-Herzegovina) will be invited as well as FRY President Lilic, which would satisfy Milosevic's demand for succession.

2. Mutual recognition of all states that have emerged from the former SFRY, including Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which the Contact Group has not mentioned so far. In return, each of the republics will have the right to express its reservations within the boundaries of official recognition, which will be limited to the formulations such as "on the condition that the constituent people reach a mutual agreement on the form of internal constitution, territory, and other contested issues" in the case of Bosnia, or "to reach an agreement between the Serbs in Krajina and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the basis of the Z-4 plan," and so forth.

3. Simultaneously with the recognition "of one another" all sanctions will be lifted and an unconditional, immediate, and lasting cease-fire agreement will be signed, while the permanent UN Security Council members will pledge themselves automatically to vote in favor of reintroduction of sanctions against any territory that substantially violates the provisions of the conference's final document. In this way, sanctions will remain in force against the Bosnian Serbs until they recognize the external form of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and enter into direct negotiations with the government in Sarajevo; however, in Krajina, they will not apply for the territories entailed by the economic agreement with Croatia. By guaranteeing free communications and trade, the conference will effectively assume the obligation to coerce Greece to lift the blockade of Macedonia.

4. The only sanctions that will remain in force will be those pertaining to the import of arms and military hardware. This will only be possible with the approval of a special commission within the ICFY, which will consist of all republics of the former Yugoslavia and which will need to pass its decisions with a consensus. It is proposed that such an arrangement remains in force for five to 10 years.

5. The Muslim-Croatian Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be guaranteed the possibility to form confederal ties with Croatia (however, only as an entire federation, which would prevent a Croatian "annexation" [previous word "Anschluss" in German] of Herzegovina). The Bosnian Serbs will have the right to a similar form and scope of confederal ties with the FRY, but only after the status and territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been settled in mutual talks.

6. The ICFY will have police and observation forces. The observers will be deployed on all republican borders and will have somewhat wider authority to check people and cargo crossing the borders than the "humanitarian observers" currently have on the Drina. Punitive measures will be introduced against those sides that do not agree to the supervision of their borders. It is clear that this issue is aimed primarily at the Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina, as Knin and Pale would not be able to count on the complete lifting of economic sanctions until they have agreed to the independent supervision of their mutual border.

7. The current UNPROFOR in Croatia will change its name to the ICFY Observation Force and will also partially change its mandate. By this, a danger of war breaking out after 31 March will be avoided, while at the same time Tudjman's request for UNPROFOR's withdrawal will be formally satisfied, which will allow the Croatian president to keep face. The Observation Force will be obliged to guarantee a return of refugees in stages and their mandate will be renewed by a permanent ICFY body.

8. The republics of the former SFRY will be obliged to recognize the passports of all the remaining republics and submit to the ICFY lists with names of citizens of other republics who are not allowed entry, accompanied with an explanation of the ban, as well as lists of those against whom charges have been filed for war crimes and similar acts. At the same time, the ICFY put forward a proposal for a general amnesty by which all sides would stop persecuting mobilized persons and volunteers, unless directly involved in war crimes.

Kozyrev's proposal for the time being does not mention the issue of succession, which is one of the Belgrade's main objections to the plan. However, that the plan was taken very seriously was proven by the fact that senior Contact Group diplomats dispersed all over Belgrade and Europe after Sunday. While Kozyrev was with Milosevic in Karadjordjevo, the American Fraser arrived in Belgrade to study the bases of the new plan. This surprisingly broad plan was discussed at hastily convened meetings at the French Embassy and other well concealed localities in Belgrade on Sunday and Monday. Although diplomats shunned reporters, it has been learned that the United States did not a priori reject the new plan and that the entire Contact Group could meet in the middle of next week, first in Zagreb and then also in Belgrade and Sarajevo.

The least resistance to the new initiative is expected in Sarajevo. It is judged that the Bosnian Government would be satisfied with recognition and, probably, the

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simultaneous establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia. It will be more difficult in Zagreb because the impression is that Tudjman, spurred on by the general support for the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate, has started feeling strong and important while the Contact Group cannot pressure him too hard because of the danger to the increasingly fragile Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. As regards Martic and Karadzic, the opinion is that they have no choice, especially because unconfirmed sources claim that several members of "the Dodik group" [independent Bosnian Serb representatives] were taken to Karadjordjevo to hear about the plan's essence from Kozyrev himself and that they did not reject it.

Sources close to the Serbian leadership say that Milosevic was so pleased with the plan that he even proposed that the conference be held somewhere in Russia. Kozyrev, reportedly, diplomatically left this issue to be settled between Moscow and Paris. In return for Milosevic's cooperation, he was promised that the ICFY will not prod substantially into Kosovo's status and the Albanian issue.

On the basis of information that has leaked from the Russian sources, claiming that the Serbian president had demanded from Kozyrev "to muzzle a little the Russian commentaries about the events in Serbia," it is judged that a decision about the plan's acceptance has already been made and that the official media in the FRY will soon realign themselves with the newly drawn policy, while the pressure on the media that supports Karadzic will intensify. Those in the know claim that Milosevic's demand referred directly to Sergey Grizunov, a former Russian correspondent in Belgrade and now Russian information minister, who protested the suppression of Independent Television Studio B.

It was agreed at the end of the Karadjordjevo meeting that nothing will be heard about the new plan until Washington's approval is secured. Milosevic made no statements, Vladislav Jovanovic was vague as usual, but Kozyrev nevertheless slipped with an answer to a question whether a meeting of Milosevic, Tudjman,and Izetbegovic would take place: "We have nothing against it; however, no result cannot be achieved if this meeting is not well prepared in advance. And we were dealing with precisely those preparations." Very seriously, it seems, judging by the secrecy among the diplomats and politicians.

Tomic Spurns Opposition Call for Special Session

LD2302214395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1922 GMT 23 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 23 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Parliament Speaker Dragan Tomic on Thursday rejected an opposition proposal for holding a special parliament session.

In explanation, Tomic said that the opposition proposals had not been prepared in keeping with the republican Constitution and the parliamentary rules of procedure.

The parliamentary clubs of the Democratic Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, the Serbian Radical Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians asked that confidence to some republican ministers be put to the vote at the next session.

The opposition parties also asked for a parliamentary debate on the situation in the power supply industry, the media, agriculture and the metal industry.

Kosovo

Serb 'Plunder' of Albanian Businesses Protested

AU2302150295 Tirana RILINDJA in Albania 22 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by Xh. R.: "Albanian Businessmen, Beware!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In spite of the fact that the Serbian occupation regime in Kosova has never for a moment let up its violence against the Albanians, it seems not to be satisfied with what it has accomplished in this regard. It is apparently for this reason that it undertakes new measures daily to perpetuate this now institutional violence. The mass detention and mistreatment of Albanian former policemen who are still being held in prison, and the daily abuse and looting in villages and towns, especially on market days, are a heavy burden on the shoulders of Kosova Albanians.

Nevertheless, the officials of this regime do not seem to be satisfied with this. They have mounted a campaign to colonize Kosova with 100,000 Serbs and will soon issue a law on citizenship and the registration of land. All these initiatives are an assault on the existence of the Albanians and constitute direct pressure against them to leave Kosova and take to the road, like the 300,000-400,000 others that are thought to have emigrated from Kosova in the last five or six years. In order to encourage such a tragic exodus, the Serbian occupation regime threw more than 130,000 Albanians out of their jobs. However, not content with this, and encouraged by the economic and social plight of its own people and its ever-empty coffers, the regime has announced even more draconian measures against Albanian proprietors, mainly shopkeepers and restaurateurs. The Serbian minister for Kosova (or its governor) Sosevic has warned that the financial police, their inspectors, and the other organs of the regime will step up their measures against Albanian businessmen because, as he underlined, they are evading their social obligations to the state. Because they do not recognize the Serbian state, they are hiding their employment documents and account books and are thus working in the "black economy," failing to pay to the state enormous sums in taxes and other contributions.

Enlarging on the new sale rhetoric of Serbian officials who say that 300 million German marks or so enter Kosova every month, the aforementioned minister could

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not restrain himself from mentioning the possibility of channeling these marks toward the coffers of the Serbian state. He said that a large quantity of goods are secured for Kosova through imports, mainly through Albanian businessmen. For this reason, he said, we have taken measures to ensure that imported goods clear customs at the border and that customs and excise duties are paid there and then, i.e. at the border of the state from which they are imported, and not at the importer's main office.

This measure was no doubt taken for very practical reasons and is intended to ensure the greatest possible plunder of hard currency, if not directly, then through its conversion dinars at the official exchange rate, currently almost 80 percent lower than the real dinar rate. This assertion doubtless is supported by the fact that checks, even though officially recognized as means of payment, are not accepted for the payment of customs duties at the border.

Meanwhile, those in power in Kosova can have no complaints as far as the looting and fining of Albanian businessmen are concerned. According to their data, the mainly Albanian firms in the commune of Prishtina were fined to the tune of 41 million dinars last year alone. Of this sum, 35 million dinars allegedly represented unpaid turnover tax, while 6 million dinars came from failures to pay income tax. Serbian officials state that 35 million dinars of the aforementioned fines had been paid by 31 December last year, which means that the remainder has no doubt been paid by now.

The case of Prishtina shows how accurate last year's forecasts by the Kosova League of Economists and the Kosova Chamber of Commerce were—according to which the Serbian rulers would rake in 190 million dinars from the mainly Albanian firms of Kosova in 1994, in the form of contributions of different kinds. If 41 million dinars were garnered from Prishtina alone, and this sum was over and above the regular payments made in the period in question, then it is entirely possible that the forecasts of Albanian economists were realized and exceeded in Kosova as a whole. This is particularly true if we also take into account the frequent plunder of the populace on market days in Kosova towns, at the border, in cafes, on the street, and in buses.

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